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I. INTRODUCTION
Collaborative Law (CL)1 is an impressive dispute resolution process that
offers significant benefits for disputants in appropriate cases. In CL, the
lawyers and clients sign a "participation agreement" promising to use an
interest-based approach to negotiation 2 and filly disclose all relevant
information. A key element of the participation agreement is the
"disqualification agreement," which provides that both CL lawyers would be
disqualified from representing their clients if the case is litigated. The
disqualification agreement is intended to motivate parties and lawyers to
focus exclusively on interest-based negotiation, because termination of a CL
process would require both parties to hire new lawyers if they want legal
representation. 3 Although a CL process can be used in many types of cases,
virtually all of the cases to date have been in family law matters. 4 The
I Some people use the term "Collaborative Family Law" (CFL), which will be used
interchangeably with CL in this article. This field is sometimes called "Collaborative
Practice," reflecting the fact that these cases often involve practitioners in addition to
lawyers, such as mental health and financial professionals. This Article uses the term
Collaborative "Law" because it focuses specifically on the role and duties of
Collaborative lawyers. This Article follows the convention of capitalizing
"Collaborative" when referring to the specific CL process, as distinct from using the
word as a generic adjective, which is not capitalized.
2 One of the hallmarks of Collaborative Law is the shift from adversarial, position-
based negotiation to a more interest-based approach. See John Lande, Possibilities for
Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice ofLawyer Disqualhfication and Process Control
in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 1315, 1319 n.6 (2003) (defining
positional and interest-based negotiation); FORREST S. MOSTEN, COLLABORATIVE
DIVORCE HANDBOOK: HELPING FAMILIES WrrHouT GOING TO COuRT (2009) 1-20
(describing change from adversarial to collaborative perspective).
3 See supra note 2, at 1322-24.
4 Despite great efforts to use CL in non-family matters, as of May 2008, we are
aware of only eight civil cases (five or six in one Canadian province). Letter from David
Hoffman, Member, Boston Law Collaborative, to the Collaborative Practice Community
of IACPD (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.bostonlawcollaborative.com/blc/235-
BLC/version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/LettertoCPCommunityandIACP.do
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Collaborative movement has grown since it was founded in 1990 and has
developed an impressive system of professional standards, local practice
groups, trainings, and publications. CL organizations have developed
marketing strategies and received much favorable publicity.5
CL is an important example of dispute system design (DSD), broadly
defined. DSD involves managing a series of disputes rather than handling
individual disputes on an ad hoc basis. Traditionally, people think of DSD as
a process used by a single organization to handle distinct categories of
disputes, such as certain disputes with its employees, suppliers, or
customers.6 "In general, DSD involves assessing the needs of disputants and
other stakeholders in the system, planning a system to address those needs,
providing necessary training and education for disputants and relevant
dispute resolution professionals, implementing the system, evaluating it, and
making periodic modifications as needed."7 CL reflects many elements of
DSD even though it does not exactly fit into the traditional DSD mold.
Rather than focusing on disputes within a single organization, CL involves a
true system of processing disputes. Indeed, CL involves a nested system of
dispute resolution, with a large central movement and numerous local
c?branch=main&language=default. Hoffman is the founding chair of the CL Committee
of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution.
5 See John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other
ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 619, 627-29 (2007) [hereinafter Lande,
Policymaking About Collaborative Law]; John Lande, The Promise and Perils of
Collaborative Law, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2005, at 29. The popular media has
publicized the advantages of CL, highlighting its use by public figures such as Robin
Williams and Roy Disney. CL has even made its way into popular films such as Juno.
See Jeffrey Cotrill, Robin Williams and His Wife Are Getting a Collaborative Divorce,
DIVORCEMAGAZINE.COM, http://www.divorcemag.com/news/robin-williams-
collaborative-divorce-juno.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); David Crary, Many Couples
Collaborating on Kinder Divorces, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-18-kinder-divorceN.htm; Roy E.
Disney Files For Divorce In LA To End 52-Year Marriage, available at:
http://www.nctimes.com/news/national/backpage/articleb729bea9-bl 16-5eca-8cfo-
ele5967bcfl9.html (last visited December 20, 2009).
The couple agreed to treat the divorce as a collaborative law case, which means
each will try to cooperate to reach a settlement out of court, according to the divorce
papers. "It will be privately and collaboratively worked out, and it will never go to
court," said Forrest S. Mosten, Roy Disney's attorney. ... Disney is nephew of Walt
Disney and one of The Walt Disney Co.'s major shareholders.
Id.
6 See Lande, Policymaking About Collaborative Law, supra note 5, at 629-30.
7 Id. at 630.
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practice groups developing their own local variations. CL leaders have self-
consciously planned and developed the CL process, including detailed
dispute process protocols and a sophisticated system for training
professionals, and educating disputants and those professionals who help
them before, during, and after their divorce. CL also features important
aspects of system design in engaging disputants early in the process and
starting with interest-based approaches.8
In a major contribution to the understanding of CL, Professor Julie
Macfarlane conducted a three-year study and found that CL negotiators
generally did not engage in adversarial negotiation and when they did so,
they usually had more information and a more constructive spirit than in
traditional negotiations.9 Macfarlane found that the results of agreements
reached in CL and traditional negotiation were generally comparable, though
sometimes the CL agreements were especially tailored to the parties'
interests. Macfarlane found no evidence that weaker parties received less
favorable outcomes than what might be expected in traditional negotiation.10
In general, CL parties and lawyers were satisfied with the process. These
findings are consistent with anecdotal reports by practitioners of achieving
positive results in many CL cases.
While CL often provides real benefits, it also poses significant, non-
obvious risks in some cases, and lawyers are required to inform participants
about the risks of the process and screen cases for appropriateness." Once
parties get into a CL process, it is purposely designed to have parties make a
commitment to stay in the process. However, if CL does not produce a cost-
effective, timely, and satisfying result, the parties may exhaust resources that
8 Although CL demonstrates many positive aspects of system design, Lande
criticizes CL practitioners for failing to follow another principle of system design-
namely, systematically assessing the needs of stakeholders and tailoring the system to
those needs. "This approach turns upside down the fundamental principle of dispute
system design that disputing processes should be designed primarily to fit parties' needs
and rather than practitioners' philosophical preferences." Id at 640.
9 Julie Macfarlane, The Emerging Phenomenon of Collaborative Family Law (CFL):
A Qualitative Study of CFL Cases 57-59 (Dept. of Justice Canada, Research Report
2005-FCY-1E, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pilfcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-
rap/2005/2005_1/pdf/2005 1.pdf. The study involved, "66 initial interviews with
lawyers, clients and other collaborative professionals at nine sites in the United States and
Canada." In each of four locations, interviews were conducted of clients and
professionals throughout four cases. A total of 150 interviews were conducted for the 16
case studies. Id. at vii, 13-15.
10 Id.
11 See infra Parts HI.A-C.
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they might need to resolve the matter. 12 Obviously, no one can know in
advance how any process will work out, or what the most appropriate process
(or processes) would be in a given case. However, it seems especially
important to consider both the benefits and risks of CL and compare CL with
other process options carefully before starting CL, given the exit barrier of
the disqualification agreement in the CL process. Although this barrier is not
insurmountable (as some cases do terminate without agreement) it can have a
major impact on the dynamics of the process, as CL practitioners regularly
attest. 13 Careful screening seems particularly important considering the
promotional information parties are likely to receive attracting them to
consider CL. As this Article shows, local CL practice group websites
generally provide glowing portrayals of CL, often with little or no indication
of any risk.14 Although CL lawyers have an obligation to assess the
appropriateness of CL (as well as other dispute resolution processes that
might be appropriate in a case)15 and provide relevant information, there is
no uniquely "right" answer about which process is best in each case.
Ultimately, parties must choose for themselves. These choices should be
made based on: a consideration of the parties' capabilities and interests;
potential risks in a case; the parties' preferences for different types of
professional services; and their preferences for certain risks over others.16
Thus, even if a case involves some of the risks described in this Article,
parties may legitimately choose CL and lawyers may legally offer it if they
comply with the ethical rules. Appendices A and B provide graphic
summaries of relevant considerations, including potential benefits and risks,
that can be useful for professionals and parties in analyzing these issues.
As this Article demonstrates, CL experts recognize that when advising
clients about the possibility of using CL, lawyers have an obligation to
provide information to clients, screen cases to assess whether their case is
appropriate, and obtain their clients' informed consent to use the process.' 7
12 See infra Part IV.
13 Most CL practitioners tout the disqualification provision as the single defining
characteristic of CL and praise its salutatory impact on the process and results. See, e.g.,
PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFEcTIVE RESOLUTION IN
DIVORCE WrrHOuT LITIGATION 17 (2d ed. 2008) (referring to the disqualification
provision as "the indispensable component of the collaborative law model").
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 See infra Parts III.A, II.B.
16 See John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 280, 285-87 (2004).
17 As discussed in this article, screening and informed consent are related but
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Although many CL authorities generally agree about these obligations, their
analyses vary widely and are often incomplete.' 8
This Article provides a systematic analysis of potential benefits and risks
of using CL. It is intended to educate CL lawyers and practice groups so that
they can better educate potential clients and comply with their obligations to
screen cases and help clients make informed decisions about use of CL. It is
also intended to help policymakers promulgate and apply relevant rules on
the subject. Bar association ethics committees may find this analysis useful
in writing ethics opinions and adjudicating possible complaints against CL
lawyers. Similarly, courts may find this useful in adjudicating any possible
malpractice law suits against CL lawyers.
Parts H.A and II.B of this Article review materials produced by CL
practitioners, including books and practice group websites. This review
shows that the books generally include language on screening for
appropriateness and identification of specific risks, while the discussion on
the websites is spotty at best. Part II.C discusses practical difficulties in
screening cases for CL.
Part IHl analyzes ethical rules and opinions governing screening and
informed consent in CL. Part III.A shows that the authorization of
"reasonable" limitations of scope of employment in Rule 1.2 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which is applicable to all lawyers, establishes
a requirement that lawyers screen possible CL cases to determine if CL
would be reasonable under the circumstances. Similarly, Part III.B shows
that Rule 1.7's prohibition of conflicts of interest also requires lawyers to
screen potential CL cases to determine whether there is a significant risk that
a conflict of interest would materially limit the lawyers' representation and
whether the lawyers reasonably believe that they can provide competent and
diligent representation. Part III.C demonstrates that CL lawyers are required
to use a thorough and balanced process in obtaining clients' informed
consent to use CL. Part III.D shows that the ethical rules and practice
distinct concepts. Screening entails some judgment by Collaborative lawyers about the
appropriateness of particular dispute resolution processes, based in part on a comparison
with other plausible processes. The purpose of screening is for lawyers to determine
whether or not to undertake a Collaborative engagement. This decision may involve
consideration of whether it is possible to design a Collaborative process that will be
appropriate for the clients. Obtaining clients' informed consent entails Collaborative
lawyers providing appropriate information to clients so that the clients can make
informed decisions. The process of obtaining informed consent requires Collaborative
lawyers to make judgments about what processes would be appropriate for clients to
evaluate, but does not require the lawyers to make judgments whether CL would be
appropriate for particular clients. For further discussion, see infra Part IH.
18 See infra Parts II.A, H.B.
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literature described in the preceding Parts could be used as evidence of the
standard of care in malpractice lawsuits and that in some courts, violation of
the ethical rules would establish a presumption of failure to meet the standard
of care.
Part IV presents data from empirical studies showing substantial
problems of CL lawyers failing to conduct adequate screening or informed
consent procedures. Part V.A provides specific guidance for practitioners to
comply with their ethical duties and reduce the risk of professional discipline
and malpractice liability. Part V.B recommends that CL leaders and trainers
provide thorough and balanced guidance to practitioners and the general
public relating to appropriateness of CL. Part V.C provides advice for state
bar ethics committees in helping CL lawyers comply with their ethical duties.
Finally, Appendices A and B provide (1) a chart comparing features of
several dispute resolution processes, including CL, and (2) a sample
information sheet that CL lawyers could use to help assess appropriateness
and elicit informed consent in respect to benefits and risks of CL.
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II. COLLABORATIVE LAW MATERIALS REGARDING APPROPRIATENESS
AND INFORMED CONSENT TO USE COLLABORATIVE LAW
A. Discussion ofAppropriateness and Informed Consent in
Collaborative Law in Collaborative Law Books
CL practitioners have published at least eight books about CL.19 Five
books are directed to practitioners 20 and three are directed to disputants.2 1
Most CL practice is in family cases and only one of the books involves non-
family cases.22
All of the books indicate that CL is not appropriate in some cases and
that it is important for lawyers or parties or both to consider whether it is an
appropriate process in particular cases. For example, Sherrie Abney writes,
"[i]f collaborative lawyers carefully consider the parties and the nature of the
disputes, they should be able to screen out a number of parties who would
not be appropriate candidates for the collaborative process." 23 Lily
Appelman states, "[p]articularly for the neophyte collaborative practitioner,
the initial screening process is critical to ensuring a successful
outcome.... The attorney has to determine at this initial meeting whether the
necessary components are there for collaborative law to be an appropriate
19 SHERRIE R. ABNEY, AVOIDING LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO CIVIL COLLABORATIVE
LAW (2006); NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE: DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE
(2004); SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN, COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (2004); RICHARD W. SHIELDS ET AL., COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW:
ANOTHER WAY TO RESOLVE FAMILY DISPUTES (2003); KATHERINE E. STONER, DIVORCE
WITHOUT COURT: A GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE (2006);
TESLER, supra note 13; PAULINE H. TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, COLLABORATIVE
DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE YOUR FAMILY, RESOLVE
LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE (2006); STUART G. WEBB & RONALD D.
OUSKY, THE COLLABORATIVE WAY TO DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY METHOD THAT
RESULTS IN LESS STRESS, LOWER COSTS, AND HAPPIER KIDS-WITHOUT GOING TO
COURT (2006). The authors are leaders in the field, particularly Stuart Webb, the founder
of CL, and Pauline Tesler, a leading theorist and trainer, who jointly received the ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution's first Lawyer as Problem Solver Award. Lawyer as
Problem Solver Award, JuST RESOL., (A.B.A. Sec. of Disp. Resol.), Oct. 2002, at 3.
20 ABNEY, supra note 19; CAMERON, supra note 19; GUTrERMAN, supra note 19;
SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19; TESLER, supra note 11.
21 STONER, supra note 19; TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19; WEBB & OUSKY,
supra note 19.
22 ABNEY, supra note 19.
23 Id. at 73 ("To accept parties that do not fit the profile of collaborative participants
as clients will set up the collaborative process for failure.").
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choice." 24 Richard Shields and his colleagues write that "it is essential to
screen clients to assess whether they are suitable for the CFL process" to
"protect [them] against risks" in the process.25 Some writers use somewhat
different language to express similar ideas, such as whether parties are
"ready" for CL,26 whether parties would "benefit from" CL or be "better off
not trying it,"27 or that CL "may not be the best option."28
Screening for appropriateness is linked to the process of obtaining the
parties' informed consent to participate in a CL process. Shields et al. write
that at the initial meeting with a client, CL lawyers should present CL "as
one option for the client to consider, along with mediation and the traditional
legal approach including litigation. The purpose of this discussion is to
screen for appropriateness for CFL, and to help the client make an informed
choice as to the most appropriate dispute resolution process for her."29 Sheila
Gutterman states that in the first meeting with a client, it is essential that the
lawyer
'helps the client identify the issues that need to be resolved, and presents
options available to accomplish this goal, including the benefits and risks of
each option.' This is the beginning of the of the decision process where the
client, assisted by counsel, ascertains which option is the appropriate
methodology for resolving the dispute. 30
Pauline Tesler approvingly cites an ethical opinion about limited scope
of representation (or "unbundling") which requires lawyers to "advise the
prospective client of any risks associated with the limitations of the lawyer's
scope of representation, and ... advise the client about his or her rights, the
alternatives available under the circumstances, the consequences of each,
their cost, and their likelihood of success." 31 She explains that it is
24 Lily Appelman, Specific Concerns for Collaborative Attorneys, in
COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 123 (Sheila M.
Gutterman ed., 2004).
25 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 55.
26 STONER, supra note 19, at 85.
27 TESLER, supra note 13, at 99.
28 TESLER & THOMPsON, supra note 19, at 35.
29 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 41.
30 GUTrERMAN, supra note 19, at 37 (quoting Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law:
A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 967 (1999)).
31 TESLER, supra note 13, at 140 (citing Los Angeles County Bar Association
Formal Ethics Opinion 502 (1999)). For further discussion of unbundling, see FORREST S.
MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES A LA
CARTE (2000); Changing the Face of Legal Practice: "Unbundled" Legal Services,
http://www.unbundledlaw.org/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2009); see also infra note 178 and
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particularly important to get clients' informed consent at the outset to engage
their commitment during the process. "Since part of the collaborative
lawyer's toolbox for guiding negotiations and managing conflict involves
keeping the client personally responsible for the progress of negotiations, it is
important that the client make a knowledgeable choice of the process in the
first instance, so that such accountability is a reasonable expectation." 32
Several authors emphasize that CL lawyers should not press clients to
use CL. For example, Tesler argues that CL lawyers should avoid "selling"
the CL process.33 Gutterman agrees, saying that it "should never be a 'hard
sell' or an 'impulse buy."' 34 Appelman also counsels against "salemanship"
by presenting only CL to clients.35
All of the CL books discuss factors that lawyers and parties should
consider in assessing appropriateness and providing information to clients so
that they can provide informed consent. 36 Table 1 summarizes the factors
discussed in the books. This table shows that there is a general consensus
among the authors about the importance of several factors and less agreement
about others. In particular, all the authors agree that personal motivation and
suitability of the parties, trustworthiness, and domestic violence are
important factors for assessing the appropriateness of the process. More than
half of the books indicate that mental illness, substance abuse, and suitability
of the lawyers also are important appropriateness factors. Less than half the
books refer to fear, intimidation of parties, or risks of disqualification.
The authors do not cite the appropriateness factors as inevitably
precluding the use of CL. Rather, they suggest that these are factors to
consider in assessing appropriateness and, in some cases, to suggest the need
accompanying text.
32 TESLER, supra note 13, at 56. "We family lawyers need to hold ourselves to
rigorous standards of informed consent when we advise clients about the risks associated
with dispute resolution options available to them-including litigation." Id. at 20.
33 Id. at 56.
34 GUTTERMAN, supra note 19, at 37 ("If the attorney feels a case is a viable
candidate for collaborative law, the reasoning should be laid out, pro and con, as for any
of the other processes.").
35 Appelman, supra note 24, at 124.
36 Some of the books include checklists or quizzes for readers to use in considering
appropriateness. See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note 19, at 299-300; STONER, supra note 19,
at 86; TESLER, supra note 13, at 94-95; TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35;
WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 35-37. Macfarlane's report also includes an excellent
discussion of the need for CL lawyers to screen for appropriateness. MACFARLANE, supra
note 9, at 65-68. Similarly, a recent study of CL cases recommends that CL lawyers
screen cases for potential problems. See Michaela Keet et al., Client Engagement Inside
Collaborative Law, 24 CANADiAN J. FAM. L. 145, 201-02 (2008).
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for engagement of additional professionals such as coaches, mental health
professionals, or financial professionals. 37
Table 1. Factors Cited in Collaborative Law Books Regarding
Appropriateness of Collaborative Law
Shields Tesler & Webb &
Abney Appelman Cameron et al. Stoner Tesler Thompson Ousky
Personal
motivation and X X X X X X X X
suitability
Trustworthiness X X X X X X X X
Domestic violence X X X X X X X X
Mental illness X X X X X X X
Substance abuse X X X X X
Suitability of X X X X Xlawyers
Fear or x X Xintimidation I A
Risks of X X
disqualification I I I
1. Personal Motivation and Suitability
The CL books discuss a wide range of specific factors related to
appropriateness that can be grouped into a general class dealing with the
parties' motivations and general suitability for using a CL process. In
general, these factors involve a desire by all parties to listen to each other,
take responsibility, cooperate respectfully in the process, share all relevant
information, and take reasonable positions. For example, Nancy Cameron
writes, "[a] client's level of self awareness, willingness to engage in creative
problem-solving, desire to move to resolution, and ability to communicate
are all going to affect the degree of difficulty of a collaborative case." 38
Although all the authors believe that personal motivation and suitability
are important, their formulations and specific indicators vary widely. Abney
3 See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note 19, at 153-59.
3 8 Id. at 157.
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says that these factors include the parties' "willingness to participate" in the
process, preference for handling the matter "discreetly" (instead of seeking
public "notoriety" and punishment of the other parties). 39 Abney states that
in screening cases for appropriateness, lawyers should assess whether parties
have realistic expectations, flexibility, and willingness to listen to the other
party.40
Appelman says that lawyers should assess whether: the parties have
"reasonable and realistic expectations;" are "educable" and not "headstrong"
or "opinionated;" there is not a problematic imbalance of power regarding
finances; the parties are "insightful . .. about relationship dynamics;" able to
"acknowledge fault;" and not "wedded" to having a day in court. 41
Cameron includes the following issues in her checklist of screening
questions: how spouses have "made decisions in the past;" what happens
when they disagree; if they have "freedom in the relationship;" how money is
handled; whether a party is on medication; how parties "press each others'
buttons;" whether parties are confident in their ability to negotiate with their
spouse in the same room; concerns about what would happen in other
processes such as mediation or court; parties' knowledge about their assets;
concerns about the children; whether there is agreement about methods of
discipline of children; whether children have seen or heard the parents fight;
and what is needed for the parties to feel safe to say what they need to say.42
Cameron writes that lawyers need not ask all of these questions and that the
level of detail depends on "the level of conflict your client describes, and the
level of trust between the spouses." 43
Shields et al. write that CL is not appropriate if "one party is not willing
to participate in a cooperative, problem-solving way" or is not willing to
"disclose sensitive information."44 They caution that "[i]ndividuals
who .. . are unwilling to take responsibility for their own choices ... must be
scrutinized carefully at the outset to determine whether sufficient support can
be put in place to allow effective participation." 45 They elaborate as follows:
Clients must share a similar commitment to work with rather than
against the other for mutually acceptable results. They must demonstrate an
acceptance of the fact of their separation, the willingness to manage or learn
39 ABNEY, supra note 19, at 58.
40 Id. at 74.
41 Appelman, supra note 24, at 123-24.
42 CAMERON, supra note 19, at 299-300.
43 Id. at 157.
4 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 55.
45 Id. at 56.
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to manage their emotions, an interest in the well-being of the other side, and
a commitment to an honourable divorce process. They must value the
benefits of maintaining their relationship, of taking a long-term view of the
issues, and of retaining control over their own solutions.
Clients who wish to prove a point, punish or control the other spouse,
enforce legal rights, or establish legal precedent are not suitable for this
process. A client who refuses to make temporary arrangements to support a
dependant spouse pending negotiations, equivocates on providing full
disclosure, or unreasonably delays in starting the process is likewise not
appropriate. 46
Katherine Stoner's checklist of questions relevant to "readiness" for CL
includes: if "[t]he decision to divorce was mutual;" the parties have "no
desire to reconcile;" "[i]t is important .. . [to] stay on good terms with
[one's] spouse;" the parties "don't blame" each other; the parties "can
disagree ... without saying or doing things [they] later regret;" they
"understand [their] financial situation;" and both parties are "good
parents." 47
Tesler indicates that the following factors are useful "guidelines" in
screening clients: "commitment to avoid litigation;" expression of "genuine
respect for and trust in one another;" "commitment to positive co-parenting;"
lack of "need to blame others for all the problems they are facing;"
"willingness to accept personal responsibility for their part in the situation;"
and not having "great difficulty [in] managing their emotions." 48 She also
suggests that "people who are in the very early stages of the grief/recovery
process" may present problems in CL (and other processes). 49
Pauline Tesler and Peggy Thompson write:
Collaborative divorce may not be a good choice when ... [o]ne or both
partners lack the ability to participate fully and freely in the discussions that
will lead to resolution [or] .. . lack the capacity to make and keep
commitments about behavior and follow-through, even with the help of
collaborative divorce coaches.50
Webb and Ousky write that factors relevant to whether CL is a "good fit"
include: parties' belief that "a successful outcome in the divorce primarily
will depend on the decisions [they] make during the process;" whether they
are "willing to let go of some smaller, short-term issues;" whether they are
4 6 Id. at 55-56 (emphasis in original).
47 STONER, supra note 19, at 86.
48 TESLER, supra note 13, at 99.
49 Id.
50 TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35.
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"capable of making the emotional commitment necessary to achieve the best
possible outcome;" whether they are "willing to try to see things from [their]
spouse's point of view;" whether "it is possible for [the parties] to restore
enough trust in each other to achieve a successful outcome;" whether the
parties are "willing to commit [themselves] fully to resolving the issues
through the Collaborative process by working toward common interests
rather than simply arguing in favor of [their] positions;" whether "it is
important [that the parties] maintain a respectful and effective relationship
after the divorce;" whether the parties "have accepted the fact that this
divorce is going to happen;" and whether the parties "believe that it is very
important that [their] children maintain a strong, healthy relationship with
both parents." 5'
2. Trustworthiness
All of the authors identify trustworthiness as an important factor in
having parties assess the appropriateness of CL for their situation, albeit with
some differences in how they define this factor. Abney writes that parties
must be willing to disclose all relevant information and that "[w]hen
collaborative lawyers have their initial consultation with prospective clients,
and the lawyers get an uncomfortable feeling about the parties' intentions or
ability to be honest, the attorneys would do well to decline representation of
those parties." 52 Appelman writes that lawyers must assess a client's
"willingness to .. . engage in the collaborative process in good faith. Honesty
and transparency cannot be abridged."53 She advises lawyers to ask whether
clients "have a fundamental distrust of the spouse." 54
Similarly, Shields et al. write:
A client who does not believe that the other spouse will ever
provide honest disclosure or negotiate in good faith is not suitable for
the process.... Individuals who ... have difficulty following through
with commitments made must be scrutinized carefully at the outset to
determine whether sufficient support can be put in place to allow
effective participation.55
51 WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 35-37.
52 ABNEY, supra note 19, at 73.
53 Appelman, supra note 24, at 124.
54 Id
55 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56.
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Stoner states that a factor relevant to "readiness" for CL is if either party
has "lied . .. about anything important."56 Tesler's guideline for clients who
will benefit from CL include couples who "express .. . trust in one
another."57 Tesler and Thompson write that "Collaborative divorce may not
be a good choice when . .. [o]ne or both partners are prepared to lie in order
to conceal information about finances." 58 Webb and Ousky's checklist for
clients to assess whether CL is right for them includes an item about whether
"it is possible for my spouse and me to restore enough trust in each other to
achieve a successful outcome." 59
3. Domestic Violence
All of the CL books also identify domestic violence as an important
appropriateness factor, which has been the subject of much analysis in both
the court and mediation contexts.60 The authors differ about whether
domestic violence should preclude use of CL or whether CL might be
especially appropriate if a competent interdisciplinary team is involved when
there has been a history of serious domestic violence.
Cameron provides the most extensive discussion of the appropriateness
of CL in cases involving domestic violence. She writes that violence and
abuse present "[p]erhaps the most difficult screening questions."61 She says
that in determining whether a case is appropriate for a Collaborative process,
people should consider whether the timing is appropriate, whether the abused
spouse may "push for settlement, any settlement" to end the conflict, and
whether the spouse can participate safely.62 She argues that "Collaborative
practice has some process components that make it more suitable than
mediation for resolving matters when there has been abuse-each spouse has
his or her own advocate, which can go some distance toward leveling power
imbalances." 63 Cameron recommends the use of "[a]n interdisciplinary team
56 STONER, supra note 19, at 86.
57 TESLER, supra note 13, at 99.
58 TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35.
59 WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 35-37.
60 Members of the domestic violence advocacy, court, and dispute resolution fields
have worked for a long time trying to develop appropriate policies in cases involving
domestic violence. See, e.g., Special Issue: Domestic Violence, Introduction of Special
Issue Editors, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 434 (2008).
61 CAMERON, supra note 19, at 154.
62 Id. at 156 (emphasis in original).
63 Id
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involving coaches and a child specialist ... [which] provides a greater level
of expertise as well as a stronger network of professionals to build protocols
particular to the needs of the family and to help create an environment that is
safe enough for negotiations." 64 She summarizes the issue as follows:
In struggling with the various issues of safety, a client's right to process
choice, and containment and de-escalation of conflict, a series of difficult
decisions needs to be made. If there has been past violence, it is important
to outline process choices clearly, and discuss whether or not a restraining
order is necessary. 65
Shields et al. agree that CL may be appropriate in cases involving
domestic abuse if handled by competent professionals, though they do not
specifically refer to an interdisciplinary team:
Some CFL lawyers have a thorough understanding of the dynamics of
domestic abuse and sufficient experience with this issue to enable them to
manage the process effectively where spousal abuse has occurred and the
abused spouse wishes to pursue CFL.... With a properly skilled lawyer,
CFL may provide the best option for resolution for an abused spouse in
cases where mediation and adjudication are not appropriate. However,
lawyers who do not have sufficient experience with domestic violence may
wish to refer that client to another CFL counsel or recommend traditional
lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation. 66
Webb and Ousky agree that CL can be appropriate in cases involving
domestic violence under certain circumstances. They write, "In many cases,
the Collaborative process can be a very effective alternative-as long as [the
parties] commit to the Collaborative process and acknowledge the past
history of violence." Victims of abuse should "make sure that [they are] not
put in an unsafe environment where [they] may feel physically or
emotionally threatened. If [they] are truly afraid of physical harm from
[their] spouse, the Collaborative process can't work; [they] may need to seek
legal protection and more traditional proceedings." 67
Abney also argues that CL may be particularly helpful in some cases
involving domestic violence. She states that a "prudent person would not
recommend" CL in "disputes involving serious physical assault, [or] sexual
abuse" as these situations "could be difficult and sometimes impossible for
the collaborative process... . While these situations are extremely stressful
64 Id.
65 Id. at 155.
66 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56.
67 WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 46.
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and communication between the parties is difficult, there are still some
advantages in the collaborative process for parties in these kinds of
circumstances that are not available in litigation."68
Several authors generally recommend against using CL in cases
involving domestic violence or do not clearly indicate whether CL might be
particularly appropriate in such cases. For example, Appelman writes that
there are "cases with certain issues such as domestic violence, that by the
very nature of the issues, are usually inappropriate for collaborative law
representation."69 Tesler writes that "[a]ctive domestic violence presents very
serious problems for collaborative lawyers-as for all professional
helpers." 70 Tesler and Thompson write that CL "may not be a good choice
when ... [d]omestic violence is occurring." 71 Stoner writes that CL "often
isn't appropriate in an abusive relationship" and advises using CL only after
both partners "have at least begun to get a handle on the root causes of the
violent behavior through counseling or support groups." 72
68 ABNEY, supra note 19, at 58.
69 Appelman, supra note 24, at 123.
70 TESLER, supra note 13, at 99.
71 TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35. Tesler and Thompson add that "no
other way of divorcing handles those challenges [including but not limited to domestic
violence] very effectively, either." Id at 36.
72 STONER, supra note 19, at 94.
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4. Fear or Intimidation
Three books refer to parties' experience of fear or intimidation as a factor
relevant to appropriateness. Of course, fear and intimidation are often
dynamics in cases involving domestic abuse, which all the books identify,
though these dynamics can occur in other cases as well. Webb and Ousky
write that "[e]ven without a history of abuse, you may still feel intimidated
by your spouse as a result of other dynamics in your relationship."73 To
assess this factor, they advise potential parties to consider whether there is a
"marked imbalance of power.. . , climate of distrust... , blaming and name-
calling,... [or if] one or the other of the parties want to control
everything." 74 They caution that "[t]he Collaborative process can work
effectively only in a safe environment, so it's important for your lawyers to
know as much as possible about how these patterns existed in your
marriage."75
Stoner also argues that feelings of intimidation affect the appropriateness
of CL:
If you find yourself easily intimidated in your spouse's presence, speaking
up may be hard for you. Practicing with the coaching and support of a
mediator or collaborative lawyer (and possibly a collaborative coach as
well), can help you get better at this... , but you'll need a minimum level
of self-confidence just to start the process.76
5. Mental Illness
Most of the CL books caution against using CL in cases where a party
suffers from serious mental illness that would impair their ability77 to
meaningfully participate and understand the CL process. For example, Tesler
and Thompson write that, "Collaborative divorce may not be a good choice
when one or both partners have serious mental illness . .. problems that
aren't under control."78 Cameron identifies several mental health issues that
may require cases be "screened out of the collaborative process," including
73 WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 45.
74 Id
75 Id
76 STONER, supra note 19, at 94.
77 The term "capacity" reflects a legal judgment of capability whereas the term
"ability" has a broader meaning.
78 TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35-36.
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cases involving: a party who has a "history of mental health problems;" is
currently "on medication or on disability for mental health reasons;" has been
diagnosed with a personality disorder (or a professional has suggested that
there may be a personality disorder); has been "hospitaliz[ed] for mental
illness;" or who has "attempted or threatened to commit suicide." 79 Tesler
also identifies a number of conditions suggesting that CL may be
inappropriate. She writes that people with "[s]erious psychiatric diagnoses
(e.g., major depression, bipolar disorder) that are unresponsive to medication
tend to do poorly" and that people "with character disorders (e.g., borderline
or histrionic personality disorder) ... tend to have difficulty keeping the
commitments central to the collaborative process."80
Other writers counsel caution regarding mental conditions more
generally. For example, Abney writes that a "prudent person would not
recommend" CL in "disputes involving serious ... mental illness."8' Shields
et al. write that individuals "who .. . have clinical issues ... must be
scrutinized carefully at the outset to determine whether sufficient support can
be put in place to allow effective participation." 82 Stoner says that one factor
relevant to "readiness" for CL is whether the parties are in "good physical
and mental health." 83
6. Substance Abuse
Most CL books identify substance abuse as a factor affecting the
appropriateness of CL. Tesler and Thompson say that "Collaborative divorce
may not be a good choice when one or both partners have . .. drug or alcohol
problems that aren't under control." 84 Cameron writes that success of
Collaborative processes will be affected by whether a spouse has substance
abuse issues and if a spouse who is abusing substances minimizes or denies
it, especially if there are children in the family.85 Cameron says that in these
situations, an interdisciplinary team is "necessary to shepherd the family
safely through the separation." 86 Similarly, Shields et al. write that
"[i]ndividuals who suffer from serious drug or alcohol abuse ... must be
79 CAMERON, supra note 19, at 153.
8 0 TESLER, supra note 13, at 100.
81 ABNEY, supra note 19, at 58.
82 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56.
83STONER, supra note 19, at 92.
84 TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35.
85 CAMERON, supra note 19, at 153.
86 Id
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scrutinized carefully at the outset to determine whether sufficient support can
be put in place to allow effective participation." 87 Webb and Ousky write that
"success with Collaborative process ultimately will depend on [the parties']
willingness to get help [they] need" if one of them has "any addictions, such
as alcoholism, drug addiction, or compulsive gambling," or codependency
issues resulting from living with someone with an addiction.88 Stoner writes
that "[a]n alcohol or drug problem can impair a person's ability to think
clearly and make sensible decisions, [which] can undermine the success of
any negotiation," including in CL.89 She advises that "any alcohol or drug
problem must be dealt with in an effective recovery program if you expect
mediation or collaboration to be effective." 90
7. Suitability ofLawyers
Some of the books focus on characteristics of lawyers as well as parties
in their discussion of appropriateness. Cameron discusses whether lawyers or
parties should proceed if a lawyer has not been trained in CL practice. She
writes, "[i]f [your client's] spouse has a lawyer who is not trained
collaboratively, you will need to decide whether or not you are willing to
work with him or her in the collaborative process."91 She concludes that, "[i]t
is not good service for either client if lawyers cannot work together within
the process." 92 Shields et. al. state that, "[T]he CFL process cannot be
followed unless both lawyers are qualified to conduct the process. The
lawyer should refuse to enter into a Participation Agreement with another
lawyer who has not been trained in CFL."93
Shields et al. also focus on the lawyers' ability to cooperate, writing that:
87 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56.
88 WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 44.
89 STONER, supra note 19, at 95.
90 Id
91 CAMERON, supra note 19, at 158.
92 Id.
93 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 55. They recommend that, when one of the
lawyers has not been trained in CFL, the CFL lawyer "work cooperatively with the other
lawyer, use a client-centered approach, consider the interests and needs of both parties in
formulating settlement proposals, and participate in four-party settlement meetings
communicating and negotiating in a collaborative way." Id This process is referred to as
"Cooperative Practice." See generally John Lande, Practical Insights from an Empirical
Study of Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203.
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CFL lawyers chosen by the parties must also assess whether they have
the capacity to collaborate together. They may have a poor track record of
working together and there may be a low level of trust between them. If a
lawyer believes that he will have difficulty working with the CFL lawyer
selected by the other client's spouse or partner, he should address this issue
directly with the other lawyer. 94
Similarly, Abney writes that "when an opposing party has retained an
attorney whom the collaborative lawyer knows will not participate fairly and
honestly in the collaborative process, the lawyer should decline that
collaborative case."95 Abney argues that some lawyers may be inappropriate
for a CL process, and she provides a typology of lawyers who are
problematic for a CL process. These include those attorneys who "never
realize that half of their cylinders are still firing in the litigation mode," or
those on "the other end of the continuum [who] ... just want everybody to be
happy, have no arguments or conflicts, and have everybody treat everybody
else 'nice."'9 6 Abney describes "chameleons" as lawyers who represent
clients who do not take personal responsibility and who "call opposing
counsel and begin to whine about everything that the defendant has done
from birth that has led to the wrong that has been inflicted upon their
client."97 "Skippers will notify opposing counsel early on that certain steps of
the process are not necessary." 98 "Legal beagles [do] not stop talking about
what the clients will get if they go to court, or what the courts can or cannot
order."99 "Warm-fuzzies are attorneys that have overreacted to the 'Rambos'
who are attorneys that rely on instilling fear and intimidation in opposing
parties. The warm-fuzzies want everybody to sing Kumbaya and feel
good." 00 "Bulldogs are sticklers for having everything letter perfect, and
they have little patience for sloppy or careless work done by others."' 0'
Abney's last category is of attorneys who say, "I have been doing
collaboration for years, and I don't need to be trained." 02
94 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56-57.
95 ABNEY, supra note 19, at 73.
96 Id. at 59.
97 Id. at 60.
98 Id. at 62.
99 Id. at 63.
100 Id. at 65.
101 ABNEY, supra note 19, at 66.
102 Id. at 68.
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8. Risks ofDisqualification
Two books also discuss the risks of disqualification, which can be a
factor affecting the appropriateness of CL. Shields et al. argue that screening
is important to avoid potential problems that could arise from a Collaborative
process. They write: "[a] collaborative client may experience a profound
sense of failure if the CFL process does not result in an agreement. He is then
put to the delay and additional cost of retaining another lawyer to act in the
adversarial arena."103 Similarly, Stoner writes:
The primary downside to collaboration is that if it doesn't work, your
collaborative lawyer is required to withdraw, and you have to start all over
with a new lawyer and possibly new experts and advisers. This means a lot
of expense and delay while you get your new lawyer up to speed and retain
new professionals.104
Perhaps the writers who did not discuss the risks of disqualification
assumed that consideration of the consequences may be obvious or merely
derivative of the appropriateness factors they do discuss.
9. Provisions in Participation Agreements
All but one of the CL books include sample participation agreements,
which establish procedures for the CL process. All of the sample
participation agreements describe how the disqualification agreement works,
and identify conditions requiring the termination of the CL process,
sometimes specifically identifying "abuses" of the process. 05 Most of the
sample participation agreements include sections with "cautions" or
"limitations." 06 The cautionary language is very similar in all the model
agreements, though some include more points than others. Gutterman's form
provides the most extensive list of cautions:
103 SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 55.
104 STONER, supra note 19, at 99.
105 See ABNEY, supra note 19, at 274-75; CAMERON, supra note 19, at 276-78;
GUTTERMAN, supra note 19, at 402-03; SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 246, 248;
TESLER, supra note 13, at 260-61; TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 19 at 262-63; WEBB
& OUSKY, supra note 19, at 197, 199.
106 See ABNEY, supra note 19, at 276 (section of agreement labeled
"understandings"); CAMERON, supra note 19, at 275-76; GUTTERMAN, supra note 19, at
401; SHIELDS ET AL., supra note 19, at 252; TESLER, supra note 13, at 143-44; TESLER &
THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 259-60; WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 19, at 193-94.
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1. We understand there is no guarantee that the process will be
successful in resolving our case.
2. We understand that the process cannot eliminate concerns about the
disharmony, distrust, and irreconcilable differences that have led to the
current conflict.
3. We understand that we are still expected to assert our respective
interests and that our respective lawyers will help us do so.
4. We understand that we should not lapse into a false sense of security
that the process will protect each of us.
5. We understand that while our collaborative lawyers share a
commitment to the process described in this document, each of them has a
professional duty to represent his or her client diligently, and is not the
lawyer for the other party. Only the lawyer retained by one party is
responsible to protect and promote that party's individual interests.
6. We understand that each lawyer will, however, take into account the
needs of the other party, endeavoring to reach a fair and reasonable
settlement of all issues. 107
These cautions are useful for parties to consider. Obviously, this list does
not address most of the appropriateness factors discussed in this Part.
Gutterman's sample agreement is the only one that states that the parties
have discussed other dispute resolution options with their attorneys and have
chosen CL. 08 Thus, these sample participation agreement forms document
some effort to address the appropriateness of CL and the parties' informed
consent, but they do not include all the factors identified in this Part.109
B. Discussion ofAppropriateness in Collaborative Law Practice
Group Websites
To gain a better understanding of what Collaborative practitioners
communicate to prospective clients about the appropriateness of CL, we
reviewed the websites of all the practice groups in the United States listed on
the website of the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals
(IACP)-the central professional association for Collaborative Practice."l0
Obviously, in their consultations with clients, CL lawyers provide
107 GUTTERMAN, supra note 19, at 401.
108 Id. at 400. The agreement lists "Traditional Court System, Simplified Divorce,
Special Master, Private Judge, Mediation, Arbitration, Mediation/arbitration, [and]
Collaborative Family Law." Id.
109 See infra Part III for discussion of requirements under ethical rules.
110 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, http://collaborativepractic
e.com/lt.aspM=7&T=PracticeGroups (last visited May 2, 2008).
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information to clients well beyond what is on the practice group websites, but
this analysis of these public websites gives some indication of what CL
practitioners who design the sites believe is important for prospective parties
to know about CL practice. It certainly provides an indication of what
prospective parties are likely to expect when they consider using CL.
Many CL practitioners belong to local practice groups, which "train and
socialize CL practitioners, publicly identify CL lawyers, develop local CL
practice protocols, build demand for CL, and form referral networks for CL
cases."'I The IACP website listed 188 practice groups in the United States,
though 57 (31%) of the groups did not have functional websites when
checked in February through April 2008.112 This analysis is based on the 126
unique, functional practice group websites identified from the IACP
website. 113
The material on practice group websites reflects some common patterns
with many variations. All of the websites describe CL and why parties should
use it, and all include contact information for practitioners in the practice
group. Many websites have a "frequently asked questions" page and links to
articles about CL or other websites relevant to CL. Some also provide
information for practitioners interested in joining the practice group. The
websites vary widely in the amount of material they provide. Some websites
Ill John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 oIO ST. L.J.
1315, 1326 (2003); see also TESLER, supra note 13, at 84-85 n.6; Macfarlane, supra note
9, at 5-7.
112 These fifty-seven practice groups include some that had no website shown on the
IACP list and some whose link was not functional. In such situations, we performed an
internet search to determine if there was a new web address that was not shown on the
IACP list. We found several such groups with functioning websites, which were included
in this analysis.
It is not clear how much, if any, Collaborative Practice is done by members of these
fifty-seven groups. Ten of the groups had no members listed on the IACP website, and
eight groups had only one member listed. Thirty-six of the groups had five or fewer
members listed and forty-seven had no more than ten members listed. Some members of
local practice groups are not IACP members; therefore some groups may be larger than
suggested by the number of members listed on the IACP website. It is also possible that
some groups were not able to attract enough members or clients to sustain a Collaborative
Practice in their respective community.
113 Because the IACP website is organized by state, and some groups operate in
more than one state or were otherwise duplicates, the IACP website includes five
duplicate listings of practice groups which are shown in each applicable state. Such
duplicated practice group websites are counted only once in this analysis. The IACP
website includes links to practice groups outside the US, but this analysis was limited to
the US to make the project more manageable.
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are "bare bones" efforts, and others are quite extensive with sophisticated
graphics. Many obviously borrow material from each other, as the same
language appears on multiple websites.
As one might expect, all of the websites highlighted potential benefits of
using CL, often using language strongly advocating its virtues. 114 We looked
to see if the websites indicate that parties should consider whether CL would
be appropriate or that it might not be appropriate in some cases. To capture a
wide range of material, we included language linked from the practice group
website (such as articles about CL)."1 5 We also counted language that is
merely suggestive, such as material indicating that CL "may" be the right
option under certain conditions, such as desire to get emotional, financial and
legal help in divorce, control of costs of divorce, address children's needs,
contain conflict, and have a confidential process without adversarial
attorneys or going to trial.116 As this example illustrates, we used a liberal
interpretation of websites' discussions of appropriateness factors.
114 The following excerpt is one of many examples of promotional language on
practice group websites:
Clients Control the Outcome
Collaborative Law is a process through which divorcing partners define their
own unique solutions assisted and advised by their own attorney.
Full and Private Disclosure
The Collaborative Law process requires full and open disclosure by the parties
of all information relevant to reaching a comprehensive divorce solution, undertaken
in a private environment which encourages full participation by the parties in
designing their divorce solution.
Team of Trained Professionals
Collaborative Law offers a team of trained professionals who work together to
enhance the future of the divorcing parties and family.
Putting Children First
Collaborative Law includes innovative approaches to putting children first by
focusing on their needs, creating workable parenting plans and helping diminish the
often difficult side effects of divorce on children.
Divorce with Dignity and Respect
Collaborative Law offers divorcing partners the opportunity to retain dignity
and respect while cooperatively working toward a resolution best suited to their
unique circumstances.
Collaborative Law Group of Southern Arizona, http://www.divorcewisely.com/ (last
visited May 1, 2008).
115 To keep the search manageable, we generally considered only websites that were
a single link away from the practice group website. Material on other practice groups'
websites were included only for that group, and not for any groups linking to them.116 See, e.g., Collaborative Divorce Professionals of Arizona, http://www.collaborati
vedivorcearizona.com/rightalternative.html (last visited May 1, 2008).
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Table 2 shows the factors described as relevant to appropriateness, based
on the list generated in reviewing the CL books, found in Part H.A. It is
important to emphasize that Table 2 exaggerates the extent of discussion of
appropriateness on practice group websites in several ways. As described in
the preceding paragraph, this search had a broad scope of inclusion of
materials and a low threshold for counting references to appropriateness. In
addition, the references to appropriateness are often phrased vaguely or
buried in a large volume of promotional language. Some websites simply
include a sentence to the effect that CL is "not for everyone.""l 7 While many
websites prominently include language under the heading of "advantages" of
CL, only a small proportion also specifically identify "disadvantages" of
CL." 8 Many websites have no language of their own discussing
117 See, e.g., Collaborative Divorce Lawyers of Tampa Bay,
http://www.collaborativedivorcelawyersoftampabay.com/ (last visited May 2, 2008). The
Academy for Collaborative Legal Practice was unusual in providing a detailed general
caution about using CL:
As compelling as any given methodology might be to us, personally, we must
beware of falling into a "one size fits all" approach. Lawyers should lay out the "full
menu" of available processes to prospective clients-even if they do not offer every
option themselves. Clients need to be educated as to the pros and cons to each
methodology, enabling them to exercise informed consent regarding which approach
is likely best for their individual circumstances. Just as a doctor does a patient no
favor by encouraging a regimen that has little chance of success-or, for that matter,
continuing in a regimen that, despite original best intentions, is not succeeding-the
lawyer should never coerce a client into a given process, though he or she may voice
preference for the approach sincerely judged to be in the client's best interests.
Indeed, despite all its positives and the passion of its practitioners,
Collaborative Law is not for all disputes, all clients, nor even all lawyers. Some
disputes require litigation. Some might be better served by mediation, arbitration, or
another ADR process.
Sheila M. Gutterman, Collaborative Law for Litigators-or-Did I REALLY Agree to
Give This Lecture?, ACADEMY FOR COLLABORATIVE LEGAL PRACTICE, http://www.acade
myforcollaborativepractice.org/Articles/CLForLitigators/tabid/64/Default.aspx (last
visited May 2, 2008) (emphasis in original); see also Keith Thompson, Can't We All Just
Get Along?, COLLABORATIVE COUNCIL OF THE REDWOOD EMPIRE, http://www.collaborat
ivecouncil.org/northbaybiz.html (last visited May 2, 2008) (providing detailed discussion
of appropriateness); Collaborative Family Law Professionals, http://www.collaborativefa
milylawyers.com/principles andguidelines.shtml (last visited May 2, 2008) (including a
statement of limitations on use of CL).
118 For an example of an article on a practice group website that includes a detailed
discussion of "disadvantages," see David A. Hoffman & Rita S. Pollak, Collaborative
Law Looks to Avoid Litigation, MASS. LAW. WKLY, May 8, 2000, available at
http://www.massclc.org/articles/avoidlitigation.pdf.
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appropriateness, but post articles that include brief references to
appropriateness. For example, some practice groups post a copy of a New
York Times article that paints a glowing portrait of CL." 9 The sole reference
to any concern about appropriateness of CL is in paragraph 27 of the 33-
paragraph article.120 Thus, although researchers analyzing the website
material for an academic study would find such language in a systematic
search of an entire website, typical visitors would not recognize the website
as providing information relevant to the appropriateness of CL in particular
cases. If we excluded linked articles from the search and limited the tally to
the website itself, the number of references would be reduced. This reduction
was especially notable for references to certain factors, especially domestic
violence (9 references instead of 17), mental illness (6 references instead of
10), and risk of disqualification (10 references instead of 20). Moreover, the
fact that a website was counted for this analysis does not necessarily indicate
that the website's discussion is thorough, balanced, or accurate. Indeed, most
of the website discussions are cursory and heavily weighted toward
encouraging readers to use CL.
119 Jane Gross, Amiable Unhitching, with a Prod, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at Fl.
120 The cautionary paragraph reads, "Ms. Diamond, and others, worry that the
collaborative lawyers' pledge not to take a case to court could in some cases actually run
up a client's bill. Let's say the husband decides to go to court. The wife, Ms. Diamond
said, is then also forced to start from scratch." Id. This paragraph was surrounded by
eight paragraphs suggesting that CL is preferable to mediation and litigation.
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Table 2. Factors Cited in Collaborative Law Practice Group Websites
Regarding Appropriateness of Collaborative Practice
Factor Number of websites Percentage of websites
Personal Motivation and Suitability 80 63
Trustworthiness 23 18
Domestic Violence 17 13
Mental Illness 10 8
Substance Abuse 9 7
Suitability of Lawyers 27 21
Fear or Intimidation 3 2
Risks of Disqualification 20 16
n = 126 websites
Almost two-thirds of the websites identify factors relating to the parties'
personal motivation and suitability. Most of the websites do not identify
other factors presented in the CL books. Indeed, the next most commonly
cited factors are the parties' trustworthiness and suitability of lawyers, which
are mentioned in only about one-fifth of the websites. Whereas virtually all
of the books identify domestic abuse and mental illness as appropriateness
factors, less than one in six of the websites mention these factors.
The remainder of this Part illustrates website material about each of the
appropriateness factors. In most websites, the references to these factors are
very brief, typically limited to a single phrase or sentence. The discussion
below highlights some of the more extensive website material, so it is
important to understand that such language is not typical, even of the
relatively few websites that address these factors at all.
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1. Personal Motivation and Suitability
Many practice group websites include material addressing questions such
as "Is Collaborative Law the best choice for me?";121 "Is a Collaborative
Divorce the right choice?";122 and "Why should I consider collaborative
practice for my divorce?" 23 Although the language varies, the responses on
the practice group websites generally indicate that CL is appropriate if the
parties want to cooperate to achieve good results in their divorce. Many
websites include questions that seem more like rhetorical devices intended to
persuade people to use CL rather than to carefully weigh the appropriateness
of CL in their case. 124 An exception to that pattern, the Separating Together
website, does not list a series of leading questions, and instead features a
detailed "self-assessment" survey designed to help parties consider the
appropriateness of CL, mediation, "divorce consulting," or an adversarial
process.125 The thirty-eight questions cover a wide range of issues, including:
ability to communicate; level of cooperation; degree of trust; desire for a
cooperative relationship in the future; existence or suspicion that a spouse
had an affair; and financial situation.126 Website visitors can complete the
survey and, based on the responses, the website suggests which process to
use.
121 Collaborative Family Law Professionals, http://www.collaborativefamilylawyers
.com/faq.shtml#5 (last visited May 23, 2008).
122 Collaborative Alternatives, http://www.collaborativealternatives.com/choice.htm
I (last visited May 1, 2008).
123 Collaborative Divorce Solutions of Orange County, http://www.cdsoc.com/2-
Ofaq.cfin (last visited May 1, 2008).
124 The following is a typical example of website responses to such questions:
To find out if you should pursue a cooperative rather than a litigated divorce,
ask yourself the following questions:
* Are you more interested in moving on with your life than in perpetuating a
marital battle in court?
* Do you want to be in control of your own future and not dependent upon who
has the best attorney?
* Do you want to be in control of your destiny, including custody and financial
support issues, rather than relying on a court's decision?
* Do you want to ensure that the members of your family each have what they
need to move forward with their lives feeling intact and secure?
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2. Trustworthiness
About one-fifth of the websites identify trustworthiness as a factor
relevant to appropriateness of CL. This typically relates to whether one party
would try to deceive or defraud the other. The Collaborative Practice East
Bay website includes the question, "How do I know whether it is safe for me
to work in the Collaborative Practice process?" and provides the following
response:
The Collaborative Practice process does not guarantee you that every
asset or every bit of income will be disclosed, any more than the
conventional litigation process can guarantee you that. In the end, a
dishonest person who works very hard to conceal money can sometimes
succeed, because the time and expense involved in investigating concealed
assets can be high, and the results uncertain.
You are generally the best judge of your spouse or partner's basic
honesty. If s/he would lie on an income tax return, he or she is probably not
a good candidate for a Collaborative Practice divorce, because the necessary
honesty would be lacking. But if you have confidence in his or her basic
honesty, then the process may be a good choice for you. 127
* Do you want the cost of obtaining your divorce to be as much as 80% less?
* Do you want your divorce to be between you and your spouse and not have
your relationship aired in public?
Choosing a cooperative divorce means that you value an approach that focuses
on the needs of the entire family. If you answered "Yes" to most of the questions
listed above, a cooperative process is right for you.
Coalition for Collaborative Divorce, http://www.nocourtdivorce.com/right.phtml (last
visited May 1, 2008). The language on this website is unusual because it uses the term
"cooperative" instead of "collaborative." For a description of Cooperative practice and a
comparison with Collaborative practice, see infra note 154.
125 Separating Together, http://www.separatingtogether.com/selfassess.html# (last
visited May 2, 2008).
126 Id
127 Collaborative Practice East Bay, http://www.collaborativepracticeeastbay.com/in
dex.cfm/hurl/obj-faq/faq.cfm#5 (last visited May 2, 2008).
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3. Domestic Violence
Surprisingly, only 14% of the websites identify domestic violence as a
factor relevant to appropriateness. Some victims of domestic abuse who want
to appease their abusers might think that CL would be very appealing, so it
would be especially important to provide some caution for victims. Although
CL might be the best process in carefully selected cases involving domestic
abuse-and with appropriate safeguards-parties, particularly alleged
victims in abusive relationships, should be clearly advised about the risks.
The Collaborative Family Law Council of Wisconsin website has a
particularly good discussion of domestic abuse, with an entire page devoted
to this topic.128 This website provides a detailed definition of domestic abuse,
list of screening questions, discussion of mental health issues, information
about temporary restraining orders, and contact information for organizations
providing relevant information and services. 129
4. Fear or Intimidation
Only three websites mention fear or intimidation as an appropriateness
factor. The Collaborative Council of the Redwood Empire's website states,
"If a client needs an immediate injunction or wishes to use litigation as a club
to intimidate or obfuscate, then collaborative law would not be in their best
interests."130 The Collaborative Law Institute of Minnesota's website states,
"Those who deeply subscribe to the notion that their divorce is an
opportunity finally to resolve their family-of-origin issues by acting
horrendously toward their spouse (or having their lawyer do it) will probably
not succeed at [Collaborative Practice]."'31
128 Collaborative Family Law Council of Wisconsin, http://www.collabdivorce.com/
da.html (last visited May 2, 2008).
129 Id.
130 Collaborate Council of the Redwood Empire, http://www.collaborativecouncil.or
g/faxonarticle.pdf (last visited May 2, 2008) (article by R. Paul Faxon, Resolving Real
Estate Disputes: The Case for Collaborative Law, BANKER & TRADESMAN, June 14,
2004, 1, 2).
131 Collaborative Law Institute of Minnesota, http://www.collaborativelaw.org/res/d
ocuments/Collaborative%20Practice-Non-Adversarial%20Issue%20Resolution.pdf (last
visited Dec. 12, 2009) (article by Stevan S. Yasgur, Collaborative Practice: Non-
Adversarial Dispute Resolution, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER, May 2007).
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5. Mental Illness
Less than 10% of the websites refer to mental illness as a factor when
considering using CL. The Collaborative Practice Institute of Michigan
website is one of the few websites that does include a caution about mental
illness. On a "frequently asked questions" webpage, in response to the
question, "Are there any types of divorce cases not appropriate for
Collaborative Practice?", the website states: "Actually, there are some types
of cases for which there is no good approach. If one or both of the parties
have significant mental disabilities, severe personality disorders, or are prone
to violence, they are not ideal candidates for the Collaborative Process." 32
6. Substance Abuse
Only 7% of the websites mention substance abuse as a factor relevant to
the appropriateness of CL. The Collaborative Law Institute of Minnesota
includes an article on its website mentioning substance abuse. In the part of
the article with the subheading, "I Want You to Annihilate My
Spouse . . . Several Times, If Possible," the article states, "CL is not
appropriate for all clients, any more than any other dissolution process is
appropriate for all clients. ... Chemically dependent persons are not good
bets (although some have succeeded). ... ."133 The Spokane County
Collaborative Professionals' website includes a detailed answer to the
question, "What if My Spouse is Abusive or Abuses Drugs and Alcohol?",
which states, in part:
Your safety must be our first concern. However, please consult with a
trained Collaborative Attorney before running to Court. Opinions differ on
this topic. Some attorneys feel most abuse situations require a traditional
approach while others feel such situations are better handled in the
Collaborative Process than in Court. Clearly such situations are more
difficult and require closer monitoring to be sure the abuse is appropriately
curbed. 134
132 Collaborative Practice Institute of Michigan, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.collaborativepracticemi.org/faq.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2009). For the purpose of
assessing appropriateness, parties and professionals presumably focus on mental
problems that might interfere with a CL process, without particular regard for a formal
diagnosis of mental pathology.
133 Collaborative Law Institute of Minnesota, supra note 131.
134 Spokane County Collaborative Professionals, http://www.spokanecountycollabor
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7. Suitability of Lawyers
About one-fifth of the websites surveyed discuss the suitability of
lawyers as a factor relating to the appropriateness of CL with particular
lawyers. Many websites simply indicate that not all lawyers are suitable for
handling CL cases. Some websites note that lawyers may or may not have
received training in CL practice, and that such training may affect their
ability to provide appropriate services. Some websites state that the
character, temperament, or relationship between lawyers may affect their
performance. The Collaborative Family Lawyers of Greater New Haven's
website addresses both issues, responding to the question, "What if my
spouse or partner chooses a lawyer who doesn't know about Collaborative
Law?":
Collaborative lawyers have different views about this. Some will "sign
on" to a collaborative representation with any lawyer who is willing to give
it a try. Others believe that is unwise and will not do that.
Trust between the lawyers is essential for the collaborative law process
to work at its best. Unless the lawyers can rely on one another's
representations about full disclosure, for example, there can be insufficient
protection against dishonesty by a party. If your lawyer lacks confidence
that the other lawyer will withdraw from representing a dishonest client, it
might be unwise to sign on to a formal collaborative law process (involving
disqualification of both lawyers from representation in court if the
collaborative law process fails).
Similarly, collaborative law demands special skills from the lawyers-
skills in guiding negotiations, and in managing conflict. Lawyers need to
study and practice to learn these new skills, which are quite different from
the skills offered by conventional adversarial lawyers. Without them, a
lawyer would have a hard time working effectively in a collaborative law
negotiation.
And some lawyers might even collude with their clients to misuse the
collaborative law process, for delay, or to get an unfair edge in negotiations.
For these reasons, some lawyers hesitate to sign on to a formal collaborative
law representation with a lawyer inexperienced in this model. 135
380
ativeprofessionals.com/faq.php (last visited May 2, 2008).
135Collaborative Family Lawyers of Greater New Haven, http://www.newhavencoll
aborativelaw.com/Articles.html (last visited May 2, 2008).
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8. Risks ofDisqualification
Only 16% of the practice group websites discuss the risks of
disqualification as an appropriateness factor. Although virtually all of the
websites refer to disqualification, usually providing an explanation of how
and why it works, most treat it as an unqualified benefit without any risks.
Some websites do include some cautionary material, however. Some
websites mention the risk of increased time and cost if the parties would not
reach agreement in the CL process. For example, the Collaborative Divorce
Team, Inc.'s website includes the question, "It sounds as though the
Collaborative process may increase attorney's fees and costs if we cannot
reach an agreement and must retain new attorneys and experts. Is this true?"
and begins the response stating, "You are correct."136
The Texas Collaborative Law Council's website includes an article
addressing special concerns that parties with limited finances may have if the
CL process terminates. The article poses the question, "What if the parties
have limited resources and cannot afford the legal fees incurred to both
collaborate and litigate if they have to?" and responds as follows:
The parties will have to make an informed decision about how
committed and realistic they are about being able to reach a settlement
through the collaborative process. If the parties cannot afford both a failed
collaboration and litigation and there is a significant chance of impasse,
economics may dictate bypassing the formal collaborative process. One
benefit of the collaborative process is that it does not begin until a written
collaborative law agreement has been signed by both parties and their
attorneys. Before such an agreement is signed the parties and their attorneys
have ample time to evaluate whether or not they believe the formal
collaborative process is appropriate for them.137
The Massachusetts Collaborative Law Council's website also notes that
dishonest parties could take advantage of the disqualification agreement in
the CL process or litigation. Citing the ethical rule requiring a client to
provide informed consent to a limitation of the scope of representation, an
article on its website states:
The collaborative attorney, both orally and in the engagement letter to
the client, must clarify the principles further espoused in the Participation
136 Collaborative Divorce Team, Inc., http://www.collaborativedivorceteam.com/inf
o.html (last visited May 2, 2008).
137 Texas Collaborative Law Council, http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/How_
ItWorks.pdf (last visited May 2, 2009) (article by Kevin Fuller, Collaborative Law:
What is it? Why do it?).
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Agreement, including that the lawyers must withdraw if the case heads to
court. Clients are advised that a dishonest party could take advantage of the
collaborative process to delay settlement or obtain an advantage in
subsequent litigation.13 8
Another article on that website makes the same point. In discussing
disadvantages of CL, it states:
Perhaps the most serious problem for the clients is the additional costs
if collaborative negotiations break down and the original attorneys must
withdraw. Collaborative law can also be abused: for example, parties with
greater financial resources could feign an interest in the collaborative
process in order to take advantage of its cooperative discovery practices,
and then, because they can better afford to change counsel, resist
settlement. 139
The Independent Collaborative Attorneys of Central Pennsylvania's
website includes a link to a recent article in U.S. News & World Report, with
an interview of CL founder Stuart Webb, who made a similar point. Asked
who may not be suited to CL, Webb responded, "If you get a CEO-Type-A
person, they [sic] might get about a quarter into the process and say, 'This is
ridiculous. I'll make her an offer sometime, and she'll accept it or not-I'm
out.' You can't do anything about that."1 40
The Collaborative Law Center of Atlanta's website states that CL
lawyers advise prospective CL clients that the other party can trigger the loss
138 Massachusetts Collaborative Law Council, http://www.massclc.org/articles/tenna
ntreynoldsreprint.pdf (last visited May 2, 2009) (article by Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris
F. Tennant, Collaborative Law-An Emerging Practice, BOSTON B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2001,
at 1, 4).
139 Massachusetts Collaborative Law Council, http://www.massclc.org/articles/avoi
dlitigation.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2009) (article by David A. Hoffman & Rita S. Pollak,
Collaborative Law Looks to Avoid Litigation, MASS. LAW. WKLY, May 8, 2000). The
King County Collaborative Law website links to another article by David Hoffman
expressing a similar view. King County Collaborative Law,
http://www.washcl.org/resources.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) (linking to David A.
Hoffman, A Healing Approach to the Law: Collaborative Law Doesn't Have to Be an
Oxymoron, CMUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 9, 2007). Hoffman states, "the primary risk is
that one party may claim to be ready to negotiate but then resists settlement. The
collaborative law agreement lacks a mechanism for overcoming such foot-dragging, other
than persuasion--or going to court, which means abandoning the process altogether and
hiring new counsel." Id.
140 Independent Collaborative Attorneys of Central Pennsylvania, at
http://www.collaborativelawpa.com/resources/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) (linking to
article, Liz Halloran, The New Way to Divorce: Splitting Up Without a Judge, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 2006).
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of their lawyer by terminating the CL process. In response to the question,
"Can a party quit during the process?", it states:
Nothing in the participation agreement precludes a party from
terminating the collaborative law process and pursuing litigation. However,
the client will have been advised at the outset that doing so will require
them to hire other counsel. Of course, the other side also will be trading
their collaborative lawyer for a litigator.141
C. Practical Challenges in Screening for Appropriateness of
Collaborative Law
Assessing the appropriateness of CL is harder than one might think from
merely having read the preceding discussion. To do a good professional job
of screening cases, lawyers must do more than simply check off items from a
list of factors. The process of providing sufficient information to clients and
screening clients is complicated for several reasons. First, some of the
challenging dynamics, especially in family law cases, are not immediately
apparent and parties may be reluctant to share relevant information,
especially at the outset. Second, the appropriateness of CL in challenging
cases may depend on the availability, potential utility, and explanation of
additional professional services, as well as the parties' willingness to use
them. Third, appropriateness of CL normally should be assessed relative to
other process options. In some cases CL may not be ideal, but parties may
prefer it to the available alternatives. Conversely, in some cases CL may not
necessarily be inappropriate but parties may prefer other options. Fourth,
various processes require differing investments of financial and emotional
resources and the appropriateness of particular options may depend on the
parties' willingness and ability to make certain financial and emotional
investments and take certain risks.
To illustrate these challenges, consider the following facts of two cases
described by Pauline Tesler. In "Case A," the divorcing spouses had been
married for sixteen years with two boys-aged eleven and eight. The
husband and wife were, respectively, a successful doctor and dentist who
earned good incomes and had a house, substantial retirement assets,
potentially valuable stock options, and some debt. Following the separation,
the children spent more time with the wife, who was concerned about the
substantial housekeeping and childcare expenses she incurred. The wife lived
in the family home and wanted to stay there as long as possible, though both
14 1Collaborative Law Center of Atlanta, http://www.collaborativelawatlanta.com/FA
Q.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
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spouses recognized that it would need to be sold at some point so that the
husband could buy a house of his own. The wife told her lawyer that she
trusted her husband's honesty but worried about getting sufficient support.
She said that the boys were doing "okay" and that she and her husband were
not having significant problems with parenting arrangements. The wife was
very interested in resolving the divorce quickly so that she could get on with
rebuilding her life. The husband told his lawyer he left the marriage because
he was not happy in the marriage and thought that both spouses should find
other partners. The husband believed his wife spent extravagantly, but he
expected to pay child support and possibly some reasonable alimony. He was
anxious to complete the divorce so that he could move on with his life and,
more specifically, avoid complications regarding valuable stock options
related to a medical device he patented.142
Tesler asks trainees in her intermediate training program, who have some
CL practice experience, to assess the "conflict potential" of this case on a
scale from one to five. On this scale, a ranking of one refers to "couples who
are highest functioning, most able to monitor and manage strong emotions,
highly self-reflective and reasonable, with the best communication skills-in
other words, those couples who are likely to reach resolution reasonably
smoothly, utilizing virtually any conflict resolution modality and professional
services configuration."l 43 A ranking of five refers to
[clouples who may initially express a desire for a contained divorce
process and an out of court resolution but who seem to lack essential
capacities for achieving those goals.. . . One or both spouses may be
volatile, unable to control or modulate their emotions; communications
may be poor and misunderstandings frequent; one or both may blame
others for their problems without taking personal responsibility; one or
the other may feel a sense of entitlement that is excessive. There may
be mental illness or substance abuse involved. These are the couples for
whom no intervention and no configuration of professional services is
likely to make the process smooth and for whom a good and
satisfactory outcome could be difficult or impossible to achieve.144
Tesler reports that her trainees generally rate this case as a one or two on
her conflict scale, and say that this case is appropriate for CL without
supplementary professionals such as coaches, child development specialists,
142 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, The New Lawyer, and Deep
Resolution ofDivorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DIsP. RESOL. 83, 104-05.
143 Id. at 106.
144 Id
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or financial experts. 145 She then describes "Case B," which has the same
basic facts but later during the case, the lawyers learn additional information.
The wife had a history of depression, hospitalizations, and a suicide attempt.
The wife was largely unaware of the couple's financial situation, spent
carelessly, and would be embarrassed to discuss the finances because it
would demonstrate her ignorance. The younger son, eight years old, had been
wetting his bed and having nightmares following the separation. The older
son had been fighting at school and was suspended from school three times
in the prior year and a half. The school conducted a neuropsychiatric
assessment of the older son and expressed concern about possible emotional
disturbance or learning disabilities. Both parents disagreed with the
assessment and hoped his situation would improve after the divorce is
completed. The husband had been involved in a three-year affair with a
coworker, and he told his wife about it on their wedding anniversary. He
lived in a short-term apartment near his girlfriend's home, which did not
have a bedroom for the boys. The apartment was approximately an hour
away from the family home and the husband could no longer share after-
school transportation. The parents disagreed about the husband's desire for
their sons to meet his girlfriend as soon as possible, and the wife's desire to
meet with the girlfriend to discuss the affair. 146
Tesler writes that most intermediate training participants rate Case B as a
three or four on her conflict scale, and many believe that "unless the parties
are willing to work with a full interdisciplinary Collaborative divorce team,
the chances of success in the Collaborative process are too slim for it to be a
good process to recommend to them." 47 As one might have guessed, Tesler
reveals that Cases A and B were actually the same, adapted from a real
case. 148 She writes:
The two lawyers-both of them experienced family law litigators,
mediators, and Collaborative lawyers, and both of them skillful in initial
interviews and "seat of the pants" sensing of red flags-elicited between
them the facts that are set out in Case A.. . . Both clients presented as
competent, assured, intelligent, respectful, and committed to consensual
self-determination of their divorce issues.... While the two lawyers would
have preferred to have more information about the family system and about
the dynamics between the spouses, no warning bells sounded. The parties'
desire to get to a quick resolution-so long as they were willing to take
145 Id
146 Id. at 106-07.
147 Tesler, supra note 142, at 107.
148 Id.
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adequate time to review financial data and clarify goals and interests-did
not seem unreasonable to either lawyer, particularly since it was mutual.
If asked, both lawyers would have assigned a rating of 2 to these parties
and this divorce after their initial consultations with their respective
clients. 149
Tesler concludes that the use of a full interdisciplinary team enabled the
parties to reach a high-quality divorce, especially benefitting the children,
and that if the parties had used mediation or a lawyers-only CL process, there
is a good chance that they would not have reached agreement or that any
agreement might have quickly fallen apart.150
This case illustrates some of the difficulties of screening the
appropriateness of cases. Even experienced, skillful lawyers with good
sensors for "red flags" did not initially see serious warning signs in this case.
It appears that both parties felt shame and failure, and they used denial to
cope with their problems. At least initially, the parties were successful in
creating the appearance of being competent, reasonable, and having readily
manageable problems.151 People often try to put on a positive face to mask
problems such as domestic abuse, mental illness, substance abuse, infidelity,
and fraud.152 Thus, the true nature of a family's problems may not be
immediately obvious. This case suggests that CL lawyers should be
especially cautious about recommending CL if there are indications of
serious problems. For example, David Hoffman sometimes waits to sign a
CL participation agreement until the second or third meeting with the other
side to make sure that [he and his] client . .. feel confident that the other
party is willing and able to collaborate."l 53
When lawyers have difficult cases like Case A or B, they would
presumably consult with their clients about the configuration of professional
149 Id. at 107-08. Tesler reports that, after about two years, the case was close to a
successful completion with the help of an interdisciplinary team. Id. at 108-09.
150 Id. at 109-11.
151 Id. at 110.
152 See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence:
Understanding the Response from Battered Women, 68 FLA. B.J. 24, 27-28 (Oct. 1994)
(describing difficulty of identifying violence that occurs "behind closed doors"); Keet et
al., supra note 36, at 197 (noting "relative invisibility" of "less extreme power
imbalances and abusive dynamics," which make them hard to detect).
153 See Posting of David A. Hoffman to CollabLaw@yahoogroups.com (Oct. 2,
2005) (on file with authors). This is similar to many mediators who choose not to have
parties sign a mediation contract or pay monies at an orientation in order to have parties
reflect about whether they want to mediate and whether they want to use the mediator
who conducted the orientation.
386
[Vol. 25:2 2010]
DUTIES TO SCREEN THE APPROPRIATENESS OF COLLABORATIVE LAW
services the clients believe would be appropriate. For example, in divorces
using mediation, Cooperative Practice,154 and traditional litigation, it is not
unusual to engage a variety of professionals at different points in a case.
Although parties and professionals normally do not understand the full extent
of the problems at the outset, good practitioners consider the possible need
for various professional services as soon as reasonably possible. In CL cases,
it is especially important to assess the need for professional services and risks
of litigation at the outset, because the termination of a CL process would
require the disqualification of all professionals from participation in any
subsequent litigation.' 55
When lawyers and parties consider what dispute resolution process to
use, the choice is normally based on a comparison of other plausible
alternatives. In some cases, the parties might be satisfied by several different
processes. In difficult cases, there may be no ideal process and parties choose
what they hope to be the least harmful process. For example, in cases
involving a substantial history of domestic violence, there are problems with
traditional litigation, mediation, Cooperative Practice, and CL.156 Thus, in
considering the choice of process, competent lawyers help clients weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives considering the facts of
each case as part of the normal process of client intake, orientation,
interviewing, and counseling.' 5 7
154 Cooperative practice (or "Cooperative law" or "Cooperative negotiation")
involves an agreement by lawyers and parties setting out a negotiation process with a
goal of reaching an agreement that is fair for both parties. These agreements vary, and
may include terms committing to negotiate in good faith, act respectfully toward each
other, disclose all relevant information, use jointly retained experts, protect
confidentiality of communications, and refrain from formal discovery and contested
litigation during negotiation. Unlike Collaborative law, however, it does not include a
disqualification agreement. For an in-depth study of Cooperative lawyers in Wisconsin,
see Lande, supra note 93. Wisconsin Cooperative lawyers report that they use additional
professionals as needed. Id. at 238-41.
155 See CAMERON, supra note 19, at 201, 221, 226 (describing the necessity of
disqualification of CL coaches, child specialists, and financial specialists from
participation in litigation following termination of a CL case).
156 See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT 31-34 (Interim Draft, Oct. 1, 2009).
157 See LEONARD L RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 862-75 (3d
ed. 2005); Lande & Herman, supra note 16; Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg,
Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure,
10 NEG. J. 49, 50 (1994); see also FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
MEDIATION: THE CUTTING-EDGE APPROACH TO FAMILY LAW PRACTICE 93-108 (1997)
(describing lawyers' ethical duties to advise clients about ADR).
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Different dispute resolution processes are likely to entail different
amounts of time and money, which may be a significant consideration for
many parties in comparing processes. The amount of time and money
required is usually very difficult to predict at the outset of a case, except in a
general range. Although one may make generalizations about the amount of
time and expense incurred in using different processes,158 assessments vary
in particular cases and may depend on various factors, such as degree of
conflict, preferences of other side about dispute resolution processes, reaction
of each side to the others' process proposals, the amount of professional
services used, and effectiveness of negotiation efforts, among others.'5 9
Although investing more time and money may produce a better process and
result, some parties may not be able to afford or want to invest as much as
might be required for optimal results. The ability to afford the costs of
disputing not only includes consideration of income and assets, but also the
amount of debt, ability to obtain additional resources (such as from family or
158 There are conflicting opinions about the general cost of CL cases, especially
when the parties use a full interdisciplinary team. For example, Tesler cites a brief article
entitled The Collaborative Divorce Team: Why Six Professionals Cost Less than Two
Lawyers, which argues that in CL, parties can use professional services only as needed
and that some services are at lower rates than for lawyers, whereas in traditional
litigation, the parties may pay for legal services that they cannot control and that are not
needed or helpful. Tesler, supra note 142, at 111 n.52.
On the other hand, many Cooperative lawyers in Wisconsin, including those who
represent clients in CL cases, believe that CL is often too cumbersome and time-
consuming; that there often is an expectation to use more four-way meetings and
professionals than needed; and that it costs a substantial number of clients more than
necessary. Lande, supra note 93, at 222-23. Indeed, some Collaborative professionals
may believe that intensive efforts generally are required in interdisciplinary CL cases. For
example, Tesler argues: "For an interdisciplinary Collaborative divorce professional
team, shallow peace is not an acceptable objective." TESLER, supra note 142, at I11.
For an appropriate comparison, one should consider comparable cases where, from
the outset, the parties want a process to negotiate a reasonable solution. In that context,
the issue is whether the use of a full interdisciplinary team from the outset of a case
produces efficiencies that outweigh the additional costs. Presumably, it does in some
cases and not others. Tesler appropriately argues that a proper accounting would consider
the costs of preventing future disputes. Id. at 111 n.52. Unfortunately, it is hard to
conduct longitudinal studies to make valid generalizations about this. For parties in
individual cases, it is particularly difficult to predict whether the immediate expenditures
will be offset by savings of future expenses that might be incurred without the current
investment in professional services. Of course, there may be non-economic benefits of
using a full interdisciplinary team, which are distinct from issues of actual cost savings.
159 See Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Law Practice: An Unbundled Approach to
Informed Client Decision-Making, 2008 J. DisP. RESOL. 163, 180 (discussing importance
of considering other parties' process preferences).
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friends), and willingness to incur additional debt. Thus, skilled attorneys
have a challenging task in counseling clients as they make these decisions.160
Consider the combined effect of case difficulty' 6 ' and clients' ability to
afford dispute resolution162 on the selection of an appropriate dispute
resolution process. For simplicity, Table 3 divides difficulty and affordability
into two groups for each dimension: high and low. Although cases do not
neatly fit into such categories in real life, this table can help analyze the
relationship between the two variables. Cell 1 involves relatively easy cases
where the parties can readily afford substantial costs of dispute resolution.
This might be like Tesler's Case A without the complications of Case B. The
parties may not need CL, especially with a full interdisciplinary team, but it
would presumably not be problematic if they make an informed choice to use
a CL process.
160 See generally STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL
LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT
ANALYSIS chs. 8, 18-22 (3d ed. 2007); Louis M. Brown International Client Counseling
Competition, Assessment Criteria and Team Feedback Form, available at
http://www.clientinterviewing.com/iccc/ICCC%2OAssessment/ 20&%20Feedback%20F
orm.doc (including as criteria: establishing an effective professional relationship;
obtaining information; learning the client's goals, expectations, and needs; analyzing
problems; legal analysis and giving advice; developing reasoned courses of action;
assisting the client to make informed choices; and dealing with ethical and moral issues).
161 Defining the difficulty of a case itself is no easy task, and is beyond the scope of
this article. Fortunately, for the purpose of this article, a rough conceptualization should
be sufficient. One might begin with Tesler's scale of conflict potential described above.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-42. Difficulty would also be affected by the
presence of appropriateness factors not mentioned in Tesler's description of her scale that
are discussed in CL books. See supra Part II.A.
162 For simplicity, this discussion assumes that the parties have roughly equal ability
to afford the costs of dispute resolution. In real life, often this is not the case. A
substantial disparity between the parties in affordability of divorce-related services can
itself be a significant factor in assessing the appropriateness of various processes.
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Table 3. Effect of Case Difficulty and Ability to Afford Costs on
Selection of Dispute Resolution Process
Degree of Case Difficulty
Low High
Ability to Afford High 1 2
Substantial Costs
+ -Low 3 4
Cell 2 involves difficult cases where the parties can afford substantial
costs. Case A, with the complications of Case B, falls in this category. Given
the difficulty of these cases, there is a significant risk that a CL case would
terminate without agreement; but if litigation should be needed, the parties
could presumably afford to hire litigation counsel and might well prefer to
take the risk of a terminated CL process considering the possibility of large
litigation costs. The parties could afford to use intensive professional services
in the CL process, which might reduce the risk that the parties would
terminate a CL process without agreement. It might be an investment worth
making.
Cell 3 involves easy cases where the parties would have a hard time
affording substantial costs. Because the cases are easy, parties might choose
CL, assuming that there is little risk that the CL process would terminate
without agreement. As the discussion of Cases A and B demonstrates,
however, it is sometimes hard to assess the difficulty of a case at the outset.
Thus, when parties have limited ability to afford substantial dispute
resolution costs, it is important for CL lawyers to carefully assess the
appropriateness of CL and the model of CL,163 and make sure that the parties
carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of available dispute
resolution options. For example, such clients might prefer a less costly
process such as mediation, using only one attorney, or unbundled legal
services. In these cases, the parties presumably would use supplementary
professional services sparingly, if at all.'1 This analysis demonstrates the
need to assess the difficulty of such cases and the prospects for success of
parties with limited or no supplementary professional services.
163 See Mosten, supra note 159, at 180-84.
164 Although a full interdisciplinary team approach in CL is appropriate for some
situations, some potential clients either cannot afford or do not want so many
professionals involved in their case.
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Cell 4 involves difficult cases where the parties would have a hard time
affording substantial costs. These are the most challenging cases because the
parties have the greatest need for professional services, but limited ability to
pay for them. The parties might be similar to those in Cases A and B, except
that instead of a high-income doctor and dentist with substantial assets, the
parties are lower- or middle-income workers with little or no net worth. In
these cases, CL might not be as appropriate as mediation or other processes.
To successfully negotiate an agreement in CL, the parties might need
extensive professional services they may not be able to afford. Given the risk
of disqualification of lawyers (and any other professionals engaged), the
parties would face a substantial risk of terminating the CL process and
having to start over with litigation counsel. 165 Considering that daunting
prospect, some parties may feel extra pressure to accept a settlement or
continue in a hopeless CL process they believe is not in their interests. For
example, Macfarlane's study quoted one "frustrated" party who said that
"after an estimated $24,000 in professional fees and nine months of
negotiations-with little accomplished-it was difficult to switch tracks and
litigate. 'Now that we're this far, it's hard to leave."'l 66 Lande's study of
Cooperative Practice in Wisconsin identified similar dynamics. Some
lawyers were concerned that pressure in CL cases "may result in unwise
agreements or perpetuation of the Collaborative process longer than
appropriate." 67 Lande interviewed a lawyer who "sometimes does
Collaborative Practice [and who] said that she has seen a 'fair number of
cases' where 'run-of-the-mill' parties incurred fees of $40,000 to $50,000
and stayed in a Collaborative process because they had invested so much
money."1 68 Lande quotes another lawyer
whose practice includes a substantial number of working class clients [who]
said that he would have a hard time telling clients that they have to find a
new lawyer and start over if they do not settle. For average middle-class
clients, he said, '[I]t is hard to justify time and money-and frankly they
don't have it.'l 69
165 Even if a CL case terminates without full agreement, the parties may settle some
issues in the process and clarify the remaining issues leading to a more manageable and
affordable litigation.
166 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 39. For additional discussion of settlement pressure
in CL, see Lande, supra note 2, at 1363-72.
167 Lande, supra note 93, at 221.
168 Id. at 262.
169 Id. at 222.
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In assessing cases in a framework like Table 3, the parties' risk
preferences are also relevant. Parties may prefer to use CL if they are
especially averse to the risks of litigation and would prefer the risks of
settlement pressure and disqualification of their professionals. On the other
hand, parties may prefer alternatives to CL if they are especially averse to the
risks of settlement pressure and disqualification of their professionals and
less averse to the risks of litigation.170 This seems particularly important for
the Cell 4 cases where CL presents the greatest risks and parties have the
least resources to manage the risks.' 71 Parties in this situation may
legitimately choose CL if, after receiving necessary information and advice,
they want to use CL in the hope of avoiding the adverse consequences of
litigation, recognizing that they assume the risk of limiting their options due
to running out of money if they do not readily resolve the matter in CL.172
Even parties averse to the risks of litigation may consider creative hybrid
procedures other than CL to reduce these risks. For example, in some cases,
David Hoffman uses "cooperative negotiation agreements" that do not
include a disqualification agreement but provide for a cooling off period and
mandatory mediation before parties may file papers in court.173 Although
Cooperative Practice may be especially appropriate for Cell 4 cases, parties
in other categories of cases may also prefer it.
170 For further discussion of risk preferences, see Lande & Herman, supra note 16,
at 285-87. This article includes a table that is reproduced as Appendix A, infra.
171 There are some efforts to develop programs offering CL for low-income parties.
See, e.g., Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative Law:
Consideration of Its Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law Disputes,
2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 465. This can be a great service in appropriate cases. It can raise
challenging problems if the parties cannot obtain litigation counsel if they do not settle in
CL. Low-income parties in difficult cases may not be able to afford other professional
services that might make CL more appropriate. Some Legal Aid offices with limited
rosters of volunteer attorneys may decide that they cannot provide parties with both CL
and litigation services. In that situation, the parties may be stuck in CL, having sacrificed
an opportunity to obtain litigation counsel. Structuring pro bono CL programs therefore
requires careful analysis. See also UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT §§ 25-26 (Interim
Draft, Oct. 1, 2009).
172 Some parties may legitimately decide that delaying possible contested litigation
may be beneficial in preventing or delaying escalation of family crisis even though they
recognize the risk of eventual litigation.
173 David A. Hoffman, Cooperative Negotiation Agreements: Using Contracts to
Make a Safe Place for a Dfficult Conversation, in INNOVATIONS IN FAMILY LAW
PRACTICE 71 (Nancy ver Steegh & Kelly Browe Olson eds., 2008). In some cases, for
example, parties may want to engage experts to provide expert evaluations of particular
issues. See Forrest S. Mosten, Confidential Mini-Evaluation, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTs. REV. 373 (1992).
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In summary, when assessing the appropriateness of CL and obtaining
clients' informed consent to use it, it is important for CL lawyers to consider:
the benefits and risks of CL and other dispute resolution options; the
availability of professional services if needed; the parties' ability to afford
dispute resolution options; their risk preferences related to settlement and
litigation pressure; and alternative procedural mechanisms for reducing or
managing risks.
III. ETHICAL RULES AND LEGAL STANDARDS RELEVANT TO SCREENING
FOR APPROPRIATENESS AND OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,174 CL lawyers have a
duty to screen potential CL cases for appropriateness and obtain clients'
informed consent to use CL. Part III.A shows how the "reasonableness"
requirement of Rule 1.2(c) requires lawyers to screen for appropriateness of
CL, and Part III.B shows that Rule 1.7 also requires lawyers to screen
potential CL cases. Part III.C describes what is required to obtain clients'
informed consent to participate in a CL process.175 CL lawyers who do not
comply with these obligations may be liable for professional negligence, as
described in Part III.D.
A. Requirement ofReasonableness ofLimitation of Scope of
Representation
Rule 1.2(c) states, "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if
the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives
174 All references to rules in this Article refer to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct unless otherwise indicated.
175 The analysis in Parts III.A-III.C is consistent with a draft report of the Ethics
Subcommittee of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution's Collaborative Law
Committee. See ETHICs SUBCOMMITEE, A.B.A. SECTION OF DIsPUTE RESOLUTION,
SUMMARY OF ETHICs RULEs GOVERNING COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE 3-8, Oct 10, 2009,
available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/DR035000/sitesofinteres
t_files/EthicsPaper(20091010).pdf. Similarly, the draft Uniform Collaborative Law Act
establishes duties of CL lawyers to screen cases for appropriateness and obtain clients'
informed consent. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT §§ 14-15 (Interim Draft, Oct. 1,
2009). John Lande was an ex officio member of the ABA subcommittee and an official
observer to the drafting committee of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act. For a
thoughtful analysis of ethical rules governing CL see Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar
and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in Professional Change, 50 ARIz. L. REV.
289, 311-23 (2008) (arguing that ethical requirements for screening and informed
consent provide a balance of client protection and client autonomy).
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informed consent."1 76 When lawyers provide CL representation, they limit
the scope of their representation by excluding the possibility of representing
CL clients in litigation. According to the ABA's annotation of Rule 1.2(c):
A lawyer who undertakes representation that is limited in scope is
providing what is known as "unbundled" legal services. That is, rather than
representing a client in connection with an entire legal matter, the lawyer is
engaged to perform a specific task, or represent the client in connection with
a specific aspect of the matter. 177
A comment to Rule 1.2 states:
A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has
limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which
representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might
otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations
may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer
regards as repugnant or imprudent.178
In CL, lawyers and clients preclude lawyers who sign a participation
agreement with a disqualification clause from representing clients in court
typically because they believe it would be repugnant to the CL process or
imprudent for advancing the client's interests.
Under Rule 1.2(c), a limitation on the scope of representation must be
"reasonable under the circumstances."l 79 This rule was amended in 2002 to
add the reasonableness requirement to the black-letter provision of the Rule,
which "had been implied through language in the Comments, but it needed to
176 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007). The Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers is consistent with Rule 1.2(c). Section 19(1) of the Restatement
provides: "(1) Subject to other requirements stated in this Restatement, a client and
lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a lawyer would otherwise owe to the client if: (a)
the client is adequately informed and consents; and (b) the terms of the limitation are
reasonable in the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
§ 19(1) (2000).
177 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2, Annot. Subsection (c)
(citations omitted). Unbundling is also called "discrete task representation." See generally
N.C. St. B., Formal Ethics Op. 10, 2006 WL 980309 (2005) (approving limited scope of
representation if the lawyer fully explains it and the client consents); MOSTEN, supra note
31; Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling: Current Developments and Future Trends, 40 FAM.
CT. REv. 10 (2002); Changing the Face of Legal Practice: "Unbundled" Legal Services,
available at http://www.unbundledlaw.org/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). Collaborative
Law is a limited scope service and as such joins the worlds of unbundling and legal
coaching. See generally Mosten, supra note 159.
178 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) cmt. 6 (2007).
179 1d. at R. 1.2(c).
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be stated in the text of the Rule." 80 According to the ABA annotation to
Rule 1.2, this amendment was needed "to clarify the allowance-and
regulation-of limited-representation agreements."'81 Reasonableness may
be based on whether the limitation would require the lawyer to violate his or
her ethical or legal obligations. The annotation provides the example of
limiting the representation to a brief telephone conversation, which might be
reasonable for a simple legal problem but unreasonable if the lawyer did not
have sufficient time to provide reliable advice.1 82
When assessing the reasonableness of using CL, ethics committees and
courts may refer to lawyers' ethical obligations. For example, Rule 1.1,
entitled "Competence," states that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." 8 3 A comment to that rule states, "Competent handling of a
particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal
elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the
standards of competent practitioners." 84 A comment to Model Rule 1.5,
governing fee agreements, states that "[a]n agreement may not be made
whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the
client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest." 85
The ethics opinions analyzing CL practice are consistent with the
preceding analysis. A 2007 ABA ethics opinion states that "collaborative law
practice and the provisions of the four-way agreement represent a
permissible limited scope representation under Model Rule 1.2, with the
concomitant duties of competence, diligence, and communication." 86 A
Kentucky ethics opinion states: "A lawyer cannot advise a client to use the
collaborative process without assessing whether it is truly in the client's best
ISO RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHIcs: THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, § 1.2 (2007-08 ed.). Since the
amendment was intended to clarify the effect of the Rule, rather than to change it, the
analysis of the Rule should be the same regardless of whether a state has adopted the
revised language.
181 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 Annot. Subsection (c).
182 Id
183 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
184 Id. at cmt. 5.
185 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 5.
186 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447, at 3
(2007).
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interest."18 7 A Pennsylvania opinion states that CL lawyers "must consider
each client's situation (especially those who are victims of domestic
violence) when deciding whether a Rule 1.2(c) limitation on the scope of
representation is reasonable and whether [they] can, indeed, provide
competent representation to a client under the limited scope of
representation."' 88 Similarly, a New Jersey ethics opinion indicates that
under Rule 1.2, a lawyer must screen potential cases to assess the
appropriateness of CL and obtain the client's informed consent. The opinion
states:
Whether the limitation that forbids a lawyer engaged in collaborative
practice from participation in adversarial proceedings is "reasonable" within
the meaning of [Rule] 1.2(c) is a determination that must be made in the
first instance by the lawyer, exercising sound professional judgment in
assessing the needs of the client. If, after the exercise of that judgment, the
lawyer believes that a client's interests are likely to be well-served by
participation in the collaborative law process, then this limitation would be
reasonable and thus consistent with [Rule] 1.2(c)....
However, because of the particular potential for hardship to both clients
if the collaborative law process should fail and an impasse result, we think
it appropriate to give some more specific guidance to the Bar as to when
this limitation upon representation is "reasonable" under the circumstances.
Thus, given the harsh outcome in the event of such failure, we believe that
such representation and putative withdrawal is not "reasonable" if the
lawyer, based on her knowledge and experience and after being fully
informed about the existing relationship between the parties, believes that
187 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, 3 (2005), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethicsopinions/kba-e-425.pdf. The opinion
approvingly quotes an article by Sheila Gutterman:
[T]he collaborative lawyer is expected to represent his or her client with the same
due diligence owed in any proceeding. Due diligence includes considering with the
client what is in the client's best interests, which includes the well being of children,
family peace, and economic stability. If the collaborative family law process is not
in the client's best interests, the attorney is charged to advise the client to choose a
different system, tailored to his or her needs.
Id. at 5 (quoting Sheila M. Gutterman, Collaborative Family Law-Part II, 30 COLO.
LAW 57 (2001)); see also N.C. St. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1, 2002 WL 2029469 (2002).
188 Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. Leg. Ethics & Prof'1 Resp., Informal Op. 2004-24, 2004
WL 2758094, at *7 (2004). The opinion states that in doing a "case-specific and fact-
specific" analysis of each case, lawyers should "take into account the individual parties'
capabilities, attitudes about professional services, and preferences about risk when
recommending a process to clients." Id. (citing Lande & Herman, supra note 16).
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there is a significant possibility that an impasse will result or the
collaborative process otherwise will fail. 189
The factors regarding appropriateness discussed in Part II all relate to
whether a CL process would be constructive and successful. For example, if
a CL client is a victim of domestic violence, is too intimidated to negotiate
with the party, has serious mental illness or substance abuse problem, cannot
afford to hire litigation counsel in event of termination of a CL process, or is
afraid that the other party is dishonest and would take advantage of the CL
process, it might be unreasonable for a lawyer to use CL in such cases. CL
lawyers can determine that a limited scope representation is reasonable only
after analyzing whether it would be appropriate under the circumstances for
the client. After conducting a competent inquiry, CL lawyers must diligently
represent their clients' interests. If there is a significant risk that using CL in
a case would not realistically advance clients' interests (or prospective
clients' interests), it would not be a reasonable limitation of the scope of the
lawyers' services to act as a CL lawyer, and doing so would violate Rule 1.2
under the New Jersey opinion. Although Rule 1.2 requires clients to provide
informed consent to limited-scope representation, such consent would be
insufficient to authorize the representation if it would be unreasonable under
the circumstances.
The ethical rules suggest that CL lawyers should continue to assess the
appropriateness of CL throughout a case. If, during a CL case, continued use
of a limited-scope representation foreseeably becomes unreasonable, CL
lawyers may be required to reassess whether the representation is permissible
and terminate their representation if no longer reasonable. 190 Consider the
following scenarios: The parties have invested substantial time and money
into a CL process, the prospects for settlement are doubtful, and if the CL
process continues without reaching agreement, one or both parties may not
be able to afford litigation.191 Or, at the outset of a CL case, the lawyers do
189 N.J. Ad. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 699 (2005).
190Under Rule 1.16(d) of the Model Rules, when terminating a representation,
lawyers must take reasonable steps to protect clients' interests such as giving reasonable
notice, allowing time to hire new lawyers, and providing papers that the clients are
entitled to. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2007). Before terminating a
CL case, lawyers may explore alternatives to termination, and recommend resources and
professionals to help clients deal with the termination. Full discussion of termination
ethics and practice is beyond the scope of this article.
19 1See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (describing "run-of-the-mill"
cases where the parties have invested tens of thousands of dollars in CL cases that did not
settle in CL making it difficult to afford new litigation counsel); see also Macfarlane,
supra note 9, at 82 ("Lawyers must also determine how and when to advise clients to
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not realize that a party has a serious substance abuse problem, but during the
process they discover the problem and the party refuses to get treatment or
act cooperatively. In these situations, under Rule 1.2, the lawyers would
presumably be required to reassess the case and terminate their
representation if it would be unreasonable to continue.
B. Requirement that Lawyers Avoid Conflicts ofInterest that
Interfere with Competent and Diligent Representation
In addition to the screening requirement under Rule 1.2, Rule 1.7
requires CL lawyers to screen cases to avoid potential conflicts of interest
and obtain clients' informed consent prior to beginning representation. Rule
1.7 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: . . . (2) there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to ... a third person....
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing. 192
Although Rule 1.7 requires a client's informed consent for a lawyer to
represent the client in a conflict of interest situation, the client's consent is
not sufficient to authorize the representation if the lawyer cannot provide
competent and diligent representation. Comment 8 to Rule 1.7 states:
[A] conflict exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the
client will be materially limited by the lawyer's other responsibilities or
398
withdraw from the collaborative process when there appears to be no or little chance of a
resolution via negotiation.").
192 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2007).
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interests.... The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client.193
Although the contractual structure of CL processes varies, 194 many CL
practitioners use CL participation agreements to establish contractual
obligations to "third persons"-namely, the other lawyer and party. Under
IACP's Standard 7.1.A(1) of its Ethical Standards for Collaborative
Practitioners, CL lawyers may not "knowingly withhold or misrepresent
information material to the Collaborative process,"l 95 and virtually all CL
participation agreements include similar provisions. The IACP Standards do
not define "material information," but many participation agreements require
disclosure of much more information than would be legally discoverable. For
example, Tesler's model participation agreement includes a provision
committing the lawyers and parties to "honesty and the full disclosure of all
relevant information." 96 Tesler argues that a CL process must be
"transparent," which includes "honesty and candor about what one is doing
and why one is doing it" and "candor about goals, priorities, and
reasoning."1 97 Thus, CL requires parties to disclose what Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow calls "settlement facts," which:
may not be legally relevant but which either go to the underlying needs,
interests, and objectives of the parties-why they want what they want in a
dispute-or such sensitive information as financial information, insurance
coverage, trade secrets, future business plans that may affect the possible
range of settlements or solutions but which would not necessarily be
discoverable in litigation. Settlement facts are to be distinguished from
"legal facts" (those which would be either discoverable or admissible in
litigation). 198
193 Id. at cmt. 8.
194 See Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DisP. RESOL. 131,
132-41 (describing variety of contractual relationships in CL, including arrangements
involving contractual obligations by CL lawyers to the lawyer and party on the "other
side").
195 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Ethical Standards for
Collaborative Practitioners 4, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/IACP-
Ethical%20Stds-Adopted-70127-FINAL.pdf (last visited May 11, 2008).
196 See TESLER, supra note 13, at 259.
197 Id. at 80.
198 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues,
No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L.
REv. 407, 423 n.67 (1997).
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A second obligation by CL lawyers under many CL participation
agreements is to correct mistakes made by the other lawyer or party.199
Third, by definition, lawyers obligate themselves to withdraw from a CL case
if any party, including the opposing party, terminates the case.200 Thus, CL
lawyers undertake obligations to third persons, and Rule 1.7 requires lawyers
to consider whether they can provide competent and diligent representation
in a CL case.
In some cases, CL lawyers would have an impermissible conflict of
interest because they would not be able to provide competent and diligent
representation. The appropriateness factors identified in Part II are relevant to
this analysis. For example, if a lawyer represents a victim of domestic
violence who seeks a divorce from an abuser, who has been proved to be
untrustworthy, or would likely seek to take advantage of a CL process, Rule
1.7 would presumably prohibit the lawyer from representing the client in a
CL process. In that situation, the victim's lawyer would be caught in a
conflict between protecting the client, who may be harmed by participating
in CL, and complying with obligations under the CL participation agreement.
For some vulnerable clients, merely participating in a process with an
intimidating opponent may seriously undermine their ability to assert their
interests. Abusers can send subtle signals to victims, which everyone else
may miss, threatening victims if they do not accede to the abusers' demands.
In such situations, lawyers might have difficulty diligently representing their
clients' interests in negotiating an agreement with an unscrupulous
adversary. Although it is possible that such lawyers could avoid an
impermissible conflict of interest, it is a significant risk that lawyers should
consider seriously.
The CL ethics opinions are consistent with this analysis. The ABA ethics
opinion states that a "contractual obligation to withdraw creates on the part
of each lawyer a 'responsibility to a third party' within the meaning of Rule
1.7(a)(2)" and concludes that "[r]esponsibilities to third parties constitute
conflicts with one's own client only if there is a significant risk that those
199 For example, a sample agreement states, "The parties and all Collaborative
Divorce professionals specifically agree that they shall not take advantage of
inconsistencies, misstatements of facts or law, or others' miscalculations, but shall
disclose them and seek to have them corrected at the earliest opportunity." TESLER &
THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 260.
200 For discussion of potential conflicts of interest based on these undertakings to
the other side in a CL case, see Gary M. Young, Malpractice Risks of Collaborative
Divorce, 75 Wis. LAW., May 2002, at 14.
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responsibilities will materially limit the lawyer's representation of the
client."20 1
201 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447, at 3, 4
(2007); see also Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. Leg. Ethics & Prof 1 Resp., Informal Op. 2004-24,
2004 WL 2758094, at *13 (2004). The ABA opinion includes ambiguous language about
whether a CL process may constitute an impermissible conflict of interest. It was written
to rebut a categorical conclusion in a Colorado ethics opinion ruling that CL necessarily
is an impermissible conflict of interest where lawyers enter contractual agreements
requiring them to withdraw if the CL process is unsuccessful. Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Formal Op. 115, at 1. Citing the Colorado opinion, the ABA opinion states, "It
has been suggested that a lawyer's agreement to withdraw is essentially an agreement by
the lawyer to impair her ability to represent the client. We disagree, because we view
participation in the collaborative process as a limited scope representation." ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447, at 4 (2007). It continues, stating
that
[a] client's agreement to a limited scope representation does not exempt the
lawyer from the duties of competence and diligence, notwithstanding that the
contours of the requisite competence and diligence are limited in accordance with
the overall scope of the representation. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the
lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's
obligation to withdraw if settlement cannot be accomplished. In the absence of a
significant risk of such a material limitation, no conflict arises between the lawyer
and her client under Rule 1.7(a)(2). Stated differently, there is no foreclosing of
alternatives, i.e., consideration and pursuit of litigation, otherwise available to the
client because the client has specifically limited the scope of the lawyer's
representation to the collaborative negotiation of a settlement.
Id. at 4-5.
This language is unclear whether it intends to indicate that a lawyer's representation
of a client in CL process can never violate Rule 1.7 or that it does not necessarily violate
Rule 1.7. Since the opinion was obviously intended to reject the Colorado opinion's
categorical conclusion that a CL process (where the lawyer is a party to the participation
agreement) always violates Rule 1.7, the ABA opinion-drafter may have written the ABA
opinion itself in categorical language. It is hard to believe that the ABA ethics committee
would say that representation in a CL process would never constitute an impermissible
conflict of interest, such as when a lawyer represents a domestic violence victim with
limited resources whose abuser is determined to take advantage of the CL process. The
more plausible interpretation of the ABA opinion-and appropriate interpretation of Rule
1.7-is that representation in a CL process does not violate Rule 1.7 if the lawyer can
comply with other ethical duties of competence and diligence.
Peppet writes, "It would be a mistake for lawyers to assume that collaborative
representation is always reasonable just because the American Bar Association's ethics
committee, for example, has implicitly found that it can sometimes be reasonable."
Peppet, supra note 194, at 157 (emphasis in original). For example, he argues that when
CL lawyers and parties use a common form of participation agreement in which lawyers
undertake contractual obligations to the other side (and without a separate retainer
agreement), it "seems more likely than not" that an ethics committee would find a
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C. Requirement that Lawyers Obtain Informed Consent Regarding
Limited Scope Representation and Conflict ofInterest
As noted in Parts III.A and III.B, compliance with Rules 1.2 and 1.7
requires clients' informed consent. Rule 1.0(e) defines informed consent as
"the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct." 202 Comment 6 to Rule 1.0 states:
The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary
according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need
to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably
adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require
communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances
giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform
the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other
person's options and alternatives. . . . In determining whether the
information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant
factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal
matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether
the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in
giving the consent.203
As this comment indicates, the elements of informed consent vary based
on the particular rule. Thus, informed consent under Rule 1.2 requires
discussion of the limited scope of representation, and informed consent under
Rule 1.7 requires discussion of possible conflicts of interest.
The ethics opinions discussing CL emphasize the necessity of obtaining
clients' informed consent. The ABA opinion states:
Obtaining the client's informed consent requires that the lawyer
communicate adequate information and explanation about the material risks
violation of Rule 1.7. Id. at 145.
202 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2007). The drafters of the Model
Rules recently changed "consent after consultation" to "informed consent." According to
experts Ronald Rotunda and John Dzienkowsi, "[t]hey did not intend any new meaning;
they just thought that informed consent was a more appropriate term for the interaction
between lawyers and clients that leads to client consent." ROTUNDA & DzIENKowsKI,
supra note 180, § 1-10(b). Thus, interpretation of rules with the former language should
be the same as rules with the new term.
203 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 cmt. 6 (2007).
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of and reasonably available alternatives to the limited representation. The
lawyer must provide adequate information about the rules or contractual
terms governing the collaborative process, its advantages and
disadvantages, and the alternatives. 204
The opinions set high standards for informed consent to use a CL
process. For example, the Kentucky opinion states:
[B]ecause the relationship between the [CL] lawyer and the client is
different from what would normally be expected, the lawyer has a
heightened obligation to communicate with the client regarding the
representation and the special implications of collaborative law process....
The duty to communicate is particularly important because the
collaborative process is dramatically different from the adversarial process,
with which most clients are familiar. The decision as to whether to use the
collaborative process is a critical one for the client-it involves both the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be
accomplished and it affects the relationship between the lawyer and the
client. 20 5
The Kentucky opinion identifies a list of risks that CL lawyers must
advise clients about:
The client must consent to the limited representation, which means he
or she must be advised of the limited nature of the relationship and the
implications of the arrangement. For example, obtaining new counsel will
entail additional time and cost; the client may feel pressured to settle in
order to avoid having to obtain new counsel; and the failure to reach a
settlement, necessitating new counsel, is not within the exclusive control of
the client-the opponent can effectively disqualify both counsel. The client
may be willing to assume these and other risks of the collaborative process
but, as previously discussed, the lawyer must communicate sufficient
204 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447, at 3
(2007) (footnote omitted). The opinion also includes the following language: "The lawyer
also must assure that the client undeistands that, if the collaborative law procedure does
not result in settlement of the dispute and litigation is the only recourse, the collaborative
lawyer must withdraw and the parties must retain new lawyers to prepare the matter for
trial." Id. (emphasis added). This is bizarre. Lawyers can provide certain information and
have thorough discussions with clients, but it is impossible to "assure" that clients
"understand" the disqualification agreement.
205 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, 3-4 (2005), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethicsopinions/kba e-425.pdf. Abney makes a similar
point, arguing that the "protocols of practice for collaborative lawyers demand that
collaborative lawyers observe higher standards of practice in every aspect of the
collaborative process than the standards that state and local bar associations require of
litigation attorneys in their areas of practice." ABNEY, supra note 19, at 74.
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information so that the client has an adequate basis upon which to base such
a decision.2 06
The New Jersey opinion also notes significant risks in CL, indicates that
CL lawyers have a heightened duty of disclosure, and warns CL lawyers that
they must provide clients with a reasonable analysis of the clients' interests
regarding possible use of CL, even if this disclosure conflicts with the
lawyers' interests in getting CL cases:
[I]t is easy to imagine situations in which a lawyer who practices
collaborative law would be naturally inclined to describe [the] risks and
benefits to the client in a way that promotes the creation of the relationship,
even if the client's interests might be better served by a more traditional
form of legal representation... . We are not prepared to conclude
categorically at this juncture that lawyers who engage in collaborative law
would be unable to deal with those conflicts honorably, or could not give
the client the information necessary to decide whether to consent to the
limitation. But informed consent regarding the limited scope of
representation that applies in the collaborative law process is especially
demanded, and the lawyer's requirement of disclosure of the potential risks
and consequences of failure is concomitantly heightened, because of the
consequences of a failed process to the client, or, alternatively, the
possibility that the parties could become "captives" to a process that does
not suit their needs.20 7
The Kentucky opinion indicates that mere signing of a CL participation
agreement is insufficient by itself to constitute informed consent and that CL
lawyers should discuss the CL process with clients and provide an
opportunity for them to ask questions.
Although the collaborative law agreement may touch on these matters
[such as advantages and risks of different processes], it is unlikely that,
standing alone, it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the rules relating
to consultation and informed decisionmaking. The agreement may serve as
a starting point, but it should be amplified by a fuller explanation and an
opportunity for the client to ask questions and discuss the matter. Those
conversations must be tailored to the specific needs of the client and the
206 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, 7-8 (2005), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethicsopinions/kba-e-425.pdf.
2 07 N.J. Ethics Op. 699, 2005 WL 3890576, at *5 (2005). Macfarlane's study found
that CL lawyers' "most frequently voiced reason for moving toward a collaborative
model of practice was an abhorrence of litigation for family matters." Macfarlane, supra
note 9, at 17. The ethics opinions require CL lawyers to give clients a reasonable analysis
of litigation it if might be appropriate, even if the lawyers abhor it and do not practice
litigation.
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circumstances of the particular representation. The Committee recommends
that before having the client sign the collaborative agreement, the lawyer
confirm in writing the lawyer's explanation of the collaborative process and
the client's consent to its use.20 8
D. Potential Malpractice Liability for Failure to Screen Cases for
Appropriateness or Obtain Informed Consent
Although we do not know of any malpractice claims filed against CL
lawyers for failing to screen the appropriateness of cases for CL or obtain
clients' informed consent, CL lawyers face considerable exposure to such
liability. As the following annotation indicates, legal ethics rules are often
used as evidence in malpractice cases and some courts hold that violation of
such rules creates a rebuttable or conclusive presumption of violation of the
lawyers' duty of care.
Although it is generally recognized that the intent of professional
ethical codes is to establish a disciplinary remedy rather than to create civil
liability, many courts have determined that pertinent ethical standards are
admissible as evidence relevant to the standard of care in legal malpractice
actions along with other facts and circumstances.. . . [M]any courts have
held that, although a violation of ethical standards does not per se give rise
to tortuous claims, the standards establish the minimum level of
competency which must be displayed by all attorneys, and where an
attorney fails to meet the minimum standards, such failure can be
considered evidence of malpractice....
Some courts have held that a violation of professional ethical standards
establishes a rebuttable presumption of legal malpractice, comparing a
violation of ethical standards to a violation of statutes and ordinances. Other
courts are split on the question whether a violation of a professional ethical
standard conclusively establishes a violation of the attorney's duty of care
and constitutes negligence per se, with some courts finding this to be
conclusive cvidcncc, and others ruling that this was not conclusive
evidence. 209
208 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, supra note 206, at 4. Cf Andrew
Schepard, Kramer vs. Kramer Revisited: A Comment on the Miller Commission Report
and the Obligation of Divorce Lawyers for Parents to Discuss Alternative Dispute
Resolution with Their Clients, 27 PACE L. REv. 677, 696-701 (2007) (arguing that it is a
"no-brainer" to enact a rule requiring lawyers to discuss ADR with clients).
209 Kathleen J. McKee, Annotation, Admissibility and Effect of Evidence of
Professional Ethics Rules in Legal Malpractice Action, 50 A.L.R.5TH 301 § 2 (1997)
(citations omitted). Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, "Proof of a
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Thus, violations of ethical rules discussed in Parts III.A-III.C may be
used as evidence of violation of lawyers' duties to their clients and, in some
courts, a violation of a rule may create a rebuttable or conclusive
presumption of the lawyers' standard of care. In addition, authoritative texts
may be used to cross-examine experts in malpractice cases; 210 thus, CL
parties suing their lawyers could use CL texts described in Part II.A to
examine expert witnesses regarding the standard of care in assessing
appropriateness of cases and obtaining informed consent.
IV. COLLABORATIVE LAWYERS' COMPLIANCE WITH DUTIES TO SCREEN
CASES FOR APPROPRIATENESS AND OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT
Conscientious CL lawyers routinely do a thorough job of obtaining
parties' informed consent and screening cases for appropriateness. Indeed,
most CL lawyers offer CL precisely because they want to help parties make
good decisions for themselves. Two studies, however, raise concerns about
how well some CL lawyers comply with duties to screen cases for
appropriateness and obtain informed consent. In 2005, Julie Macfarlane
published a major three-year study of CL practice in the U.S. and Canada.211
More recently, Michaela Keet and her colleagues conducted a smaller study,
which identified similar concerns. 212 Macfarlane found that there were
violation of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of lawyers .. . does not give rise to an
implied cause of action for professional negligence" but may be used as evidence of the
standard of care if the rule or statute was designed to protect people in the plaintiffs
situation, and the evidence is relevant to the plaintiffs claim. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) (2000).
210 See W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Use of Medical or Other Scientific Treatises in
Cross-Examination ofExpert Witnesses, 60 A.L.R.2D 77 (1958); 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§
756, 1005.
211 Macfarlane's study is a thoughtful, balanced, and responsible study that provides
a nuanced portrait of CL practice. For description of the methodology, see Macfarlane,
supra note 9. The study is based on data collected between 2001 and 2004. See id at 13-
15. Although the CL field has developed significantly since then, the findings are
probably still quite relevant. About 12,000 lawyers have been trained in CL and about
5,000 belong to a local practice group. Tesler, supra note 142, at 84 n.6 (citing private
communication with Talia Katz, executive director of IACP). Even though many lawyers
have developed substantial experience and skill in handling CL cases since Macfarlane
collected her data, it seems likely that there are many CL lawyers with little experience or
sophistication. Macfarlane found that even among "lawyers who have taken a short
(usually two-day) CFL training program and whose case experience is very limited,
sensitivity to potential ethical dilemmas appears to be low." Macfarlane, supra note 9, at
63.
212 See Keet et al., supra note 36, at 194-99. We know of only one other empirical
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sometimes "mismatches" in expectations and values between CL lawyers and
clients. 213 For example, "Clients generally took a far more pragmatic
approach to their use of CFL than their lawyers did. Lawyers were more
likely to describe loftier goals that, for some, bordered on an ideological
commitment." 214 She also found that "CFL is being widely marketed as
faster and less expensive than litigation" and that "sometimes, clients who
signed on for CFL largely because of the 'promises' of speedy and
inexpensive dispute resolution are bitterly disappointed with their final bill
and disillusioned by how long it has taken for them to reach a resolution." 215
Moreover, "Many CFL lawyers promote the collaborative process to all their
potential family clients"216 Macfarlane found that
[w]hen asked, virtually all CFL lawyers say they explain mediation to their
clients, but [based on interviews with clients in this study] client
comprehension seems to vary. Furthermore, it is clear that CFL lawyers
prefer, and therefore promote, the collaborative process. One lawyer stated
that she still regards mediation "as a first resort, not a last
resort.".. .However, this is an unusual view among CFL lawyers. Some
lawyers candidly acknowledge that they do not really think about mediation
any longer as an alternative. .. . More generally, some CFL lawyers appear
to see little use for mediation, believing collaborative law to be a superior
process in every respect.2 17
Lawyers in Macfarlane's study also varied in whether they screen cases
for appropriateness:
study of CL, which provides an overview of CL practice but does not substantially
address screening or informed consent procedures. See William H. Schwab,
Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DiSP. REsOL.
L.J. 351 (2004).
213 See Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 26-27. Although Macfarlane found that the
results of CL cases were generally quite positive, clients in her study were surprised and
frustrated by numerous aspects of the CL process, leading to mismatches of expectations.
This Article highlights a few of these issues.
214 Id. at 25.
215 Id. at 25 (footnote omitted). The Keet study found that "Although only two of
the eight clients cited time or cost-saving as a reason for attempting CL, the majority felt
unprepared for the length of the process." Keet et al., supra note 36, at 165. These
findings are consistent with the observations of the tone and content of CL practice group
websites analyzed in this Article. See supra Part II.B.
216 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 65.
217 Id. at 74 (citation omitted); see also David A. Hoffman, Colliding Worlds of
Dispute Resolution: Towards a Unfied Field Theory ofADR, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 11, 15
("Some Collaborative practitioners dismiss mediation as a 'lesser process' and too
expensive.").
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Some of the more experienced CFL lawyers adopt a more sophisticated
approach, developing screening criteria that focus on client qualities such as
reasonableness and openness, and will actually turn away clients whom they
consider unsuited to collaboration. Other CFL lawyers, however, are so
keen to get their first experience of CFL that they make no such
evaluation. 2 18
Macfarlane also found general problems in CL lawyers' process of
obtaining clients' informed consent:
Data from this study, as well as from discussions with experienced CFL
counsel, indicate that a central ethical issue for the practice of CFL is the
quality and depth of informed consent to the procedural, and perhaps the
substantive, values of CFL... . In theory, informed consent is sought and
given in all new cases. All CFL lawyers undoubtedly inform their clients of
the impact of choosing a collaborative lawyer, walking them through a
participation agreement that sets out (among other terms) a disqualification
clause in the event they decide to litigate, a commitment to full and
voluntary disclosure, a commitment to a collaborative "team" approach and
so on.2 19
Nonetheless, Macfarlane found that CL parties have problems in
understanding what to expect because some lawyers have relatively little
experience and have a hard time explaining things in concrete language that
clients can readily understand.
One problem is that these terms are fairly abstract definitions that may
not be meaningful to clients. Another problem is that inexperienced CFL
lawyers often cannot and do not fully anticipate the issues that may arise in
the process, or the broader implications of participating in an extra-legal,
voluntary negotiation process. This results in complaints from clients that
the process is not proceeding as they had expected.... The challenge here
is to determine how well CFL lawyers create a real understanding for naive
(especially first-time) clients of what the formal language of the
participation agreement might mean for them in practice.220
218 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 65. Keet and her colleagues found that half of the
parties in their study "felt that their lawyers should have questioned whether their case
was appropriate for CL." Keet et al., supra note 36, at 195.
219 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 64-65.
2201d. Peppet makes similar observations. He "worries" because he has "met a non-
trivial number of practitioners who have never read Rule 1.2, who assume that there is a
special legal ethics rule about Collaborative Law already in place, or who admit to not
explaining the Collaborative Law process to their clients in much detail." Peppet, supra
note 194, at 157.
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Macfarlane found evidence of some specific risks identified in the CL
books and ethics opinions. For example, she found that "A number of clients
commented that their lawyers seemed to underestimate the level of
emotionality that would inevitably color the negotiation process between
themselves and their spouse." 221 Clients had different expectations about the
impact of the disqualification agreement. Macfarlane found that some clients
understand the commitments and the risks involved in CL. She quotes one
client who said, "Signing the four-way contract was a little scary. I didn't
want to start with another lawyer. But it made us realize it would cost a lot
more if we didn't settle it."222 However, some found that "the pressure to
stay in the process may become extreme and inappropriate" because of the
disqualification agreement. 223 She wrote that "one of the clients clearly
experienced a form of entrapment: 'Now that we're this far, it's hard to
leave. I have already spent around [$X] and all of this time-what do I have
to show?" 224 The Keet study describes one party who "'went home and lost
sleep over' the fear of losing her lawyer" and that it "felt like another
victimization thing" when her husband "threatened not to show up."225 Two
other parties in that study initially felt hopeful about the process and both
"made superficial gains" but they "came closer to reaching agreement," their
spouses "used the power to withdraw at the very end, leaving both feeling
violated." 226 Macfarlane notes that "if the client starts over with another
221 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 34. Based on reactions of clients in her study,
Macfarlane wrote, "CFL is subject to the criticism that this approach is not realistic about
the emotional burden clients carry during divorce." Id at 35. Similarly, Keet and her
colleagues found that parties "tended to be surprised by the emotional intensity of the
process" and several parties described the process as "emotionally damaging." Keet et al.,
supra note 36, at 162-63, 166. Only two of the sixteen cases in Macfarlane's study and
none of the cases in the Keet study involved an interdisciplinary team. Macfarlane, supra
note 9, at 51; Keet et al, supra note 36, at 157. Such teams might better address clients'
expectations for handling difficult emotional issues. See generally Tesler, supra note 142.
222 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 39.
223 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
224 Id at 69. Keet and her colleagues describe parties who felt a similar pressure.
One said that her husband took advantage of the disqualification agreement because he
knew that she would have to "leave [her] lawyer, find a new lawyer, pay for a new
lawyer," which he knew would be very difficult for her to do. Keet et al., supra note 36,
at 191-92. Another "felt without recourse since the process had cost her a great deal of
time and money" and that her husband "knew he could get away with not complying with
any of the terms of it without [her] having to threaten to take legal action. .. . He could
afford to pay the legal bills; he knew that [she] couldn't." Id. at 174.
225 Keet et al., supra note 36, at 191.
226 Id at 198-99.
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lawyer in a litigation process, the money spent to date is seen as largely
wasted." 227
A recent court case illustrates a possible failure to properly screen a case
for CL. In a divorce case, the wife had a child named Charles resulting from
an affair in 2004, and she began another affair in February 2007.228 In the
spring of 2007, she suggested that the couple separate and use a CL
process. 229 Around the time of the separation, the husband became
"suspicious about Charles's parentage" because of jokes that "Charles looked
nothing like him." 230 In the affair the wife began in 2007, she spent
large blocks of time away from plaintiff and her children while embarking
on numerous trips with [her lover] M., including one in which they traveled
to Argentina for 18 days. During the course of these trips, plaintiff was left
to care for the children, in at least one instance taking them on vacation by
himself, while defendant remained largely incommunicado, refusing to
provide contact information to her husband. Plaintiff also avers that during
one family vacation to San Diego, M. secretly followed the family to the
West Coast, where defendant shunned dinner and day trips with her
husband and children so that she could spend time with M.231
These facts suggest that the wife was not trustworthy and that the
husband took a major risk to enter a CL process with her. The court found
that the wife defrauded the husband, who was entitled to recover the fees he
paid in the CL process.232 The husband was a corporate attorney 233 and thus
presumably was more sophisticated than many parties who consider CL. Yet
even this presumably sophisticated party and his CL lawyer may have failed
to consider serious warning signs that CL would be inappropriate (though it
is possible that they consciously decided to try to avoid risks of litigation and
get the benefits of CL despite the risks in CL). The appellate court opinion
did not discuss whether his lawyer complied with the duty to screen the case
for appropriateness or obtain informed consent. At this point, it is impossible
to know with confidence the extent to which CL lawyers comply with the
227 Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 62.
228 Howard S. v. Lillian S., 876 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 357 (Nardulli, J., dissenting). These trips apparently occurred before the
CL process began. For example, during the wife's Argentina trip, the husband became
suspicious and arranged for a paternity test of Charles, which showed that the husband
could not possibly be the child's father and he later filed for divorce. Id.
2 32 Id. at 355.
233 Id. at 357 (Nardulli, J., dissenting).
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duties of obtaining informed consent and screening cases for appropriateness.
We assume that the vast majority of CL lawyers make serious efforts to do
so-probably more often than lawyers do in other types of practice. Even so,
there is evidence that there is room for improvement in this aspect of CL
practice.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE COLLABORATIVE LAWYERS'
COMPLIANCE WITH DUTIES TO SCREEN CASES FOR APPROPRIATENESS
AND OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT
A. Recommendations for Collaborative Law Practitioners
CL practitioners should take seriously the advice of CL books and the
requirements of ethical rules by incorporating responsible protocols into a
regular routine for screening potential CL cases and obtaining clients'
informed consent to use CL.234 Lawyers should provide thorough and
balanced descriptions of CL practice, including candid discussions of
possible risks. They should also provide appropriate descriptions of other
available processes that clients might reasonably consider, such as mediation,
Cooperative Practice, and litigation, even if the lawyers do not offer these
services or personally do not like them.235
234 Mosten has written an extensive guide for obtaining clients' informed consent,
which CL practitioners should read and adopt his recommendations as appropriate in
their practices. See Mosten, supra note 159. The spectrum of options includes processes
in which the parties handle their problems with various configurations of professional
help, starting with no help (by living with the problem or negotiating without professional
help) to inclusion of multiple professionals including mediators, lawyers, and other
professionals. For an excellent discussion of the range of dispute resolution processes, see
Hoffman, supra note 217. The discussion in this article focuses specifically on practices
to assure compliance with ethical duties and reduce exposure to disciplinary sanctions
and malpractice liability.
235 As Macfarlane argues, lawyers should present "both mediation and collaborative
law as clear options for family clients, with clients making the final decision."
Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 82. Similarly, when Cooperative Practice is available, CL
lawyers have a duty to provide a reasonable discussion of it with clients. Many CL
lawyers are wary of Cooperative Practice, just as they are about mediation. Hoffman
writes:
Some Collaborative practitioners disparage the Cooperative Process as "perhaps a little
too much like a wolf in sheep's clothing"-a form of practice that is "potentially
dangerous [due to] the risk that it will mislead clients and practitioners because of the
temptation to take an easy way out of a difficult problem."
Hoffman, supra note 217, at 16. As described in Part II, Cooperative Practice may be
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CL practitioners who have websites, or who belong to practice groups
with websites, can begin the education process by posting information that is
easily understandable, such as the charts in Appendices A and B. The New
Jersey ethics opinion says that "it is easy to imagine situations in which a
lawyer who practices collaborative law would be naturally inclined to
describe those risks and benefits to the client in a way that promotes the
creation of the relationship, even if the client's interests might be better
served by a more traditional form of legal representation." 236 The ethics rules
and opinions indicate, however, that such an approach would not satisfy
lawyers' ethical duties and, indeed, would put them in jeopardy of
professional discipline and malpractice liability. When drafting written
material for potential CL clients, lawyers should consider it not only as an
advertisement to attract new clients but also as a possible "Exhibit A" in
proceedings against lawyers by CL clients. Thus, CL lawyers should avoid
the temptation to underplay risks in CL.
It may be tempting for some CL lawyers to become over-confident due
to the apparent lack of formal complaints to date and the general approval of
CL in ethics opinions, including the ABA ethics opinion's repudiation of the
Colorado ethics opinion.237 Although all the ethics opinions so far (other than
Colorado's) have generally approved of CL practice, these opinions
condition their approval on lawyers' compliance with the ethical rules,
particularly regarding informed consent.238 CL websites certainly can include
promotional language and need not take the scrupulously neutral approach of
a Consumer Reports article. Practitioners should be wary, however, of using
language that over-promises and makes CL seem too good to be true.239
more appropriate than CL in some cases, in part because some parties may prefer it.
Thus, when it might be appropriate, CL lawyers should provide a reasonable analysis of
its potential advantages and disadvantages given the facts of the situation.
236 N.J. Ethics Op. 699, supra note 207.
237 See Peppet, supra note 194, and accompanying text. Peppet writes:
[A]s an ethics scholar I have to say that I have at times felt that Collaborative Law
practitioners have been too blas6 about the ethical complexities of their experiment.
I routinely hear, or see in print, broad, sweeping statements about Collaborative
Law's obvious compliance with the ethics codes. This is a deeply mistaken and
naive view. Although collaborative experimentation with the lawyer-client
relationship can produce real benefits, it should not be undertaken lightly.
Id. at 132. He is concerned that some CL practitioners will become "complacent" because
of the ABA ethics opinion and predicts that some ethics committees may restrict
permissible CL practices, as the Colorado opinion does. Id. at 160.
238 See Lande, Policymaking about Collaborative Law, supra note 5, at 682-87.
239 Macfarlane argues that "the CFL movement should generally be cautious in
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Even if CL public relations material surpasses the standards of conventional
advertising, CL lawyers have a professional duty to obtain informed consent,
which is not the case for providers of most consumer goods and services.
Many of the practice group websites reviewed in Part II.B could be
problematic and practice group members may wish to revise their website
content, possibly adapting material from other websites that provide more
information about appropriateness factors. Lawyers may understandably
worry about losing possible CL cases if they provide more thorough and
balanced information.240 We believe that this risk of losing business is
outweighed by the professional and practice benefits (and obligations) of full
disclosure and truly informed consent.24 1 By providing appropriate
information before parties decide whether to use CL, lawyers can have
greater confidence that parties will have realistic expectations, participate in
the process more constructively, and be less likely to terminate a CL case.
Informed consent disclosures are not required in writing, but it is in
everyone's interest to put them in writing, especially if a lawyer's or practice
group's website has a slick promotional tone. A statement merely
summarizing the disqualification provision without explaining the
implications probably does not satisfy the ethical requirement. The Kentucky
ethics opinion states, "Although the collaborative law agreement may touch
on these matters [such as advantages and risks of different processes], it is
unlikely that, standing alone, it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the
rules relating to consultation and informed decisionmaking." 242 As that
opinion indicates, lawyers should not simply rely on written materials, but
should discuss the CL process with prospective CL clients, focusing on the
appropriateness of CL given the facts of each case and providing an
opportunity for the client to discuss these issues.243
making such claims and especially when using them as a basis for obtaining consent to
participate in CFL." Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 26. "There is an unfortunate tendency
for innovative informal dispute resolution processes to respond to the potential for 'bad
press' by either minimizing or simplifying the new and complex practice choices faced
by practitioners; it would be prescient of the CFL movement to avoid repeating these
mistakes." Id. at 64.
240 Tesler writes: "A client who hesitates about choosing Collaborative Practice is
likely to blame the professional who pushes the client to choose that option as soon as the
going gets tough." Tesler, supra note 142, at 116 n.57.
241 For example, if a CL lawyer gives full disclosure and obtains a client's informed
consent before representation begins, a client in an unsuccessful CL case may be less
inclined to complain about fee churning or seek a refund.
242 Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425, supra note 206, at 4.
243 Id.
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A recent article by Forrest Mosten provides a great deal of practical
advice in educating clients about CL. The article describes providing general
information about CL, comparing CL with full service representation and
mediation, discussing how mediation and CL could be used in the same case,
and describing the variations in CL processes and the lawyers' approach to
CL. Mosten also recommends that CL lawyers inform clients about their
practices, including: membership in CL practice groups; whether they litigate
non-CL cases; their approach to use of inter-disciplinary teams or mediation
in CL cases; whether the lawyer would engage in a CL process if the other
lawyer has not been trained in CL; and how the lawyer would respond to a
threat of litigation in CL.244
Lawyers' screening cases for appropriateness is closely connected with
the informed consent process.245 Many CL practitioners use the first four-
way meeting to review the participation agreement, which is good practice,
but this review does not fully satisfy lawyers' ethical requirements.
Typically, participation agreements do not discuss "material risks" of CL in
any detail, if at all, nor do these agreements provide compare alternative
procedures, as required by ethical rules. 246 Moreover, the critical discussion
assessing appropriateness should occur solely between a lawyer and client
(i.e., not in the presence of the other side), well before the first four-way
meeting.247 Consider a case involving domestic violence. The victim may be
afraid to discuss appropriateness of the process in front of the abuser.
Similarly, it is important to discuss the other appropriateness factors
244 See Mosten, supra note 159, at 170-93; see also Forrest S. Mosten, Lawyer as
Peacemaker: Building a Successful Law Practice Without Ever Going to Court, 43 FAM.
L.Q. 487, 495-514 (2010) (describing variety of services that dispute resolution
professionals can provide).
245 For a good discussion of screening, see Macfarlane, supra note 9, at 65-68.
246 See supra Parts II.A.9, III.D.
247 Peppet makes the same point:
If that conversation occurs in a four-way meeting with the lawyer and client
from the other side, it is unlikely that a client will have the freedom to discuss the
issue fully. That discussion would not be confidential (because of the presence of the
other side), nor would the client likely feel able to raise concerns about the process
with her lawyer. If the client is concerned that her divorcing husband will not fully
disclose information, for example, she may not express that reservation as freely
with the husband sitting across from her.
Peppet, supra note 194, at 158. We recommend that this information be provided to the
client even before the first attorney-client meeting via the lawyer's website, brochure,
firm information packet, or in other marketing efforts. Lawyers' duty to assess
appropriateness continues throughout the process. See supra notes 191-92 and
accompanying text.
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privately, when each party is less subject to "groupthink" pressure in a four-
way meeting, where parties may be reluctant to raise difficult questions or
doubts because everyone else seems ready to proceed.248
Even though the Model Rules do not require that the clients' consent be
given in writing, it is obviously good practice to do so. 249 The chart in
Appendix B, with a signature line on the bottom, illustrates one method of
documenting informed consent. The Mid-Missouri Collaborative and
Cooperative Law Association includes the following provision in the
participation agreement, in bold, which the parties must initial, 250 in addition
to signing at the end of the agreement:
We understand that actual or potential disqualification of lawyers and
other professionals could have an influence on our negotiation process and
could result in additional cost and delay if we need to retain new lawyers or
other professionals. We believe that the benefits of the [Collaborative Law]
Process outweigh the risks for us. We indicate our understanding of the
Process and our desire to use it by initialing the next line.251
The parties' signing of this provision would not, in itself, satisfy the
informed consent requirement, but it would provide a helpful caution and
affirmation at the outset of a CL process, presumably after the parties have
had private conversations with their lawyers. It should also constitute
compelling evidence if there is a later claim about lack of screening or
informed consent. 252
248 See Lande, Policymaking About Collaborative Law, supra note 5, at 265 n.239
(quoting definition of groupthink as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity
override their motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (quoting
IRVING L. JANIS, GROuPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 9 (2d ed., rev. 1983)).
249 See Peppet, supra note 194, at 152-53, 156-57 (noting that some state ethics
rules do require consent to be in writing).
250 We recommend that lawyers explain to clients that their initials are required to
highlight a particularly important provision of a document, verify that the client has read
and understands this provision, and protect against substitution of a modified page.
251 Mid-Missouri Collaborative and Cooperative Law Association, Participation
Agreement in Collaborative Law Process, http://www.mmccla.org/wp-
content/uploads/collabpartic.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008) (including lawyer
disqualification agreement).
252 Although not directly related to issues of informed consent, CL lawyers should
also seriously consider Peppet's recommendations to (1) use separate CL retainer
agreements (between each lawyer and client) and CL participation agreements (between
the parties), and (2) avoid having CL lawyers sign contractual four-way CL agreements
where the lawyers are parties to the contract. See Peppet, supra note 194, at 157-60.
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B. Recommendations for Collaborative Law Leaders and Trainers
IACP leaders and members deserve great credit for providing guidance
to CL practitioners by developing statements of ethical standards and
principles for trainers and practitioners,2 53 and promoting practice groups,
training, publications, and conferences. IACP documents provide some basic
guidance about screening and informed consent. Relevant to informed
consent, Standards 5.1-5.3 of IACP's Minimum Standards for Collaborative
Practitioners state:
5.1. A Collaborative lawyer shall inform the client(s) of the full
spectrum of process options available for resolving disputed legal issues in
their case.
5.2. A Collaborative practitioner shall provide a clear explanation of
the Collaborative process, which shall identify the obligations of the
practitioner and of the client(s) in the process, so that the client(s) may
make an informed decision about choice of process.
5.3. A Collaborative practitioner shall assist the client(s) in establishing
realistic expectations in the Collaborative process and shall respect the
clients' self determination; understanding that ultimately the client(s) is/are
responsible for making the decisions that resolve their issues.2 54
Standard 2.10 of IACP's Minimum Standards for Collaborative Basic
Training states that trainees "should be exposed to and educated
about. . . [o]ne's ability and limitations to effectively assess the capacity of
the client for effective participation in the collaborative process." 255 LACP's
Principles of Collaborative Practice document does not specifically address
assessment of appropriateness of CL or obtaining parties' informed consent
to use a CL process.2 56
253 See International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Standards, Ethics and
Principles, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/ t.asp?M=8&MS=5&T=Ethics (last
visited Nov. 29, 2009). Professor Ted Schneyer argues that CL organizations play an
important role in managing the CL process beyond the ability of the legal profession to
do on its own. See Schneyer, supra note 175, at 324-34.
254 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Minimum Standards for
Collaborative Practitioners, 3 http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/IACP-
Ethical%20Stds-Adopted-70127-FINAL.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
255 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Minimum Standards for
Collaborative Basic Training, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/IACPTm
ingStdsAdptd_407_13_Corctd.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
256 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Principles of
Collaborative Practice, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/Principles%20of
%20Collaborative%20Practice.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008). This document states that
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The Collaborative Law Committee of the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution has provided a valuable service by developing a detailed
informed consent protocol which provides a checklist of factors relevant to
choice of dispute resolution process including specific issues to discuss with
clients considering using CL.257 This is important because despite the general
consensus of CL experts about the importance of screening cases and
obtaining informed consent described in Part II.A, a review of CL practice
group websites suggests that most groups have provided little guidance to
their members or potential clients on this subject. CL professional
organizations could develop and publicize materials to help practitioners and
prospective CL parties reasonably understand issues related to
appropriateness of CL and other dispute resolution processes. This might
include materials similar to the charts in Appendices A and B.
It is important that educational materials about CL should provide a
balanced presentation of the issues including the benefits and risks of CL and
other dispute resolution processes. IACP's website, like most of the practice
group websites and much of the CL literature, currently are heavily weighted
toward touting the benefits of CL with little or no discussion of potential
risks.258 For example, the IACP website includes a page entitled, "Will It
Work for Me?," which states that "no single approach is right for everyone"
and lists seven elements of personal motivation but does not address other
factors related to appropriateness that would help readers make an informed
choice. 259 The IACP website also includes a page entitled "Divorce:
Collaborative vs. Litigation," which provides an imbalanced portrayal, with
"happy talk"260 about CL and a distorted negative picture of litigation.261 The
the Collaborative process begins with an "assessment of the individual needs of each
client," but, the statement apparently assumes that the client has already decided to use a
CL process. It provides no indication that CL might not be appropriate in some cases. See
id.
257 Collaborative Law Committee, Amer. Bar. Ass'n, Suggested Protocol to Obtain
Clients' Informed Consent to Use a Collaborative Process (2009). John Lande
participated in the drafting of this protocol.
258 For example, a number of practice group websites include a video of a segment
about CL on the nationally televised Today Show, in which CL lawyer Neil Kozek said
that there are "no real risks" in CL. See, e.g., New York Association of Collaborative
Professionals, Today Show Clip, http://www.collaborativelawny.com/today-show.php
(last visited May 9, 2008).
259 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Will It Work for Me?,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/_WillItWork.asp (last visited May 9, 2008).
260 Pauline Tesler criticizes "happy talk" in books with "cheerful illustrations" that
give glamorized and unrealistic impressions about simple shared parenting agreements
reached with little professional assistance. See Tesler, supra note 142, at 110 n.51
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webpage features a chart with comparison of CL and litigation on eleven
dimensions. The description of CL gives no hint of any risks or contra-
indications. The description of litigation inaccurately implies that litigated
cases are generally tried in court rather than being resolved through
negotiation or mediation. For example, the table states that in litigation, the
"[j]udge controls process and makes final decisions." 262 Although this is true
in trial, most litigated cases are settled 263 and parties typically participate in
negotiation to some extent and must make decisions about settlement.
Similarly, the chart states that in litigation, "[1]awyers fight to win, but
someone loses," 264 ignoring the fact that lawyers routinely negotiate and the
resulting settlements are not necessarily stereotypical "win-lose" results. 265
(quoting Judith Wallerstein, Foreword to ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO
WORLDS (2005)). By the same token, IACP and CL practitioners should avoid similar
happy talk about CL that makes it seem easier than it often is and that does not alert
prospective parties about potential risks.
261 See International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Divorce:
Collaborative vs. Litigation, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/PDFs/IACPDivor
ceVsLitigation.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
262 Id.
263 See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 877 (2006)
("more than 90% of divorcing spouses" resolve their cases by negotiation before
requesting courts to enter decrees based on their agreements).
264 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Divorce: Collaborative
vs. Litigation, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/PDFs/IACP DivorceVsLitigatio
n.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
265 Contrary to popular perception, scientific researchers consistently find that
divorce lawyers generally strive to be considered "reasonable." See LYNN MATHER ET
AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK 48-56, 87-109 (2001) (finding a "norm of the
reasonable lawyer" in the general community of divorce law practice); HUBERT J.
O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFORMAL PRESSURES IN
PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 132-43 (1963) (finding that almost two-thirds of
matrimonial lawyers define their roles as counselors who try to shape clients'
expectations and achieve reasonable results through negotiation); AUSTIN SARAT &
WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND
MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 53-58 (1995) (describing lawyers' strategies to
persuade clients to accept what is legally possible in negotiations); Howard S. Erlanger et
al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce
Context, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 585, 593, 601 (1987) (finding that divorce lawyers often
press clients to accept settlements that the lawyers believe are reasonable). Although the
empirical research finds that some lawyers do act unreasonably, this is not the norm for
family lawyers. See, e.g., MATHER ET AL., supra at 48-51, 113-14, 121-25; SARAT &
FELSTINER, supra at 108; Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family
Lawyers Are Really Doing When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 616 (2006)
(categorizing more than sixty percent of lawyers negotiating family law cases as using a
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Similarly, the chart states that in litigation there is "[n]o process designed to
facilitate communication," 266 ignoring the fact that many courts provide (and
sometimes require) mediation. 267 At the bottom of the chart, it does state that
litigation is "[m]andatory if [there is] no agreement" and that "[y]ou and your
spouse negotiate through your lawyers," 268 but overall, it provides a
misleading impression of litigation.
IACP leaders and CL practitioners may be reluctant to discuss potential
risks of CL out of fear of losing some of the divorce market or concern that
acknowledging risks in CL practice would undermine its legitimacy.269
Although these concerns are understandable, CL practitioners should be
more candid for several reasons. First, being fully candid is consistent with
the fundamental values of CL. The IACP Principles of Collaborative Practice
states: "The Collaborative Practitioners help each client make fully informed,
intelligent and voluntary decisions. The commitment to full disclosure and
the withdrawal requirement are essential elements of a safe process." 270 This
commitment to fully-informed decisions should apply to decisions about
what process to use as well as decisions within a CL process.
Second, we believe that candid acknowledgment of risks will enhance
people's confidence in CL. Every dispute resolution process has risks.
Although CL practitioners may attract some clients with glowing
advertisement language, parties are entitled to know the entire story before
"buying" the process. Candidly acknowledging risks in some cases, as the
authors of all the CL books do, improves confidence in CL practice. Indeed,
such acknowledgment of risks may increase confidence for many clients by
problem-solving approach).
266 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Divorce: Collaborative
vs. Litigation, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/PDFs/IACPDivorceVsLitigatio
n.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
267 See COLE ET AL., MEDIATION LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 6:4 (2d ed. 2008).
268 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Divorce: Collaborative
vs. Litigation, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/PDFs/IACPDivorceVsLitigatio
n.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
269 See Hoffman, supra note 217, at 17-18 (describing economics and ideology as
sources of tension within the dispute resolution field); see also John Lande, The Top Ten
Reasons Collaborative Practitioners Give for Not Acknowledging Risks of Collaborative
Practice (Particularly the Disqualification Agreement), http://law.missouri.edu/lande/pub
lications/Lande%20Top%2OTen%20Reasons%20of%20CP%20Practitioners.pdf (last
visited Oct. 8, 2009).
270 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Principles of
Collaborative Practice, 2, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/lib/Ethics/Principles%20
of%20Collaborative%20Practice.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008).
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demonstrating self-confidence, realism, and responsibility by entering the
process with full knowledge of potential risks.
Third, since CL lawyers have ethical duties to assess appropriateness of
CL and obtain clients' informed consent to use it, the CL movement has an
interest in promoting knowledge and compliance with these duties by
Collaborative practitioners and avoiding problems from non-compliance.
Although it is impossible to prevent all problems, and compliance with these
duties would not prevent all complaints about CL (or any form of practice), it
seems likely to prevent some foreseeable problems as well as maximize
competent client care. CL leaders and trainers have a special responsibility in
guiding the CL movement. They provide information and direction to rank-
and-file CL practitioners about what is important to understand and convey
to prospective clients. Leaders and trainers also provide legitimacy for using
or avoiding particular practices. Thus, we recommend that IACP leaders, CL
practice group leaders, and CL trainers should clearly send the signal to
practitioners that serious assessment of appropriateness and obtaining clients'
informed consent is the right thing to do.
C. Recommendations for Bar Association Ethics Committees
Now that bar association ethics committees have almost unanimously
found that CL practice does not inherently violate ethics rules, they are likely
to focus more attention on application of the general rules to CL practice and
compliance with the rules. This article demonstrates that: (1) ethical rules
require CL lawyers to screen cases for appropriateness 27 1 and obtain clients'
informed consent; 272 (2) CL authorities identify numerous specific factors
relevant to the appropriateness of CL;273 and (3) there are some problems
with the patterns of compliance of CL lawyers with duties regarding
screening and informed consent. 274 Part of the problem is that some novice
CL lawyers do not know what factors are relevant to the appropriateness of
CL.275
Ethics committees could help promote compliance with the ethical rules
by explicitly identifying relevant factors in CL cases. For example, ethics
opinions might state that factors that may be relevant to the appropriateness
of Collaborative law include: (a) the motivation and suitability of the parties
271 See supra Parts ULA, HlI.B.
272 See supra Part III.C.
273 See supra Part II.
274 See supra Part IV.
275 See supra note 221, and accompanying text.
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to participate effectively in a Collaborative process; (b) the trustworthiness of
the parties; (c) whether a party is intimidated from participating effectively in
the Collaborative process; (d) whether there has been a history of domestic
violence between the parties; (e) whether a party has a mental illness; (f)
whether a party is abusing alcohol or other drugs; (g) whether the lawyers are
suitable for handling the case collaboratively; (h) whether the parties would
use professional services in addition to Collaborative legal services; (i) the
parties' ability to afford to retain new lawyers if the Collaborative process
terminates without agreement; and (j) the parties' views about the risks of
disqualification of lawyers and other professionals in the case. Presumably
such ethics opinions would indicate that the existence of any of these factors
does necessarily preclude lawyers from undertaking a CL representation.
Rather, these factors should help guide lawyers in complying with their
ethical obligations. Moreover, such opinions presumably would indicate that
the duty to assess the reasonableness of limited scope representation
continues throughout the Collaborative law process and lawyers should
reassess this whenever they learn facts relevant to whether it may be
appropriate for their clients to continue in the process.
Some people might worry that issuing such opinions would increase the
risk of complaints seeking professional discipline or malpractice suits by
disgruntled CL clients who would claim that their lawyers did not provide
sufficient advice about the appropriateness of CL. As Parts II and III clearly
establish, however, CL lawyers already are legally required to assess
appropriateness and obtain informed consent under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Thus, lawyers are already subject to potential
discipline if they do not comply with these obligations. Moreover, in
malpractice suits, the ethical rules and CL texts could be used as evidence of
the standard of care and, in some states, may even presumptively establish
the standard of care.276 Thus, such opinions should not increase lawyers'
exposure much, if at all. Indeed, the additional language might actually
reduce these risks by making lawyers more aware of and vigilant in
complying with their duties related to potential CL cases.
Although ethics committees should be concerned about potential
exposure to unwarranted malpractice litigation, the clients have the burden of
proving violation of a duty that caused compensable damages, 277 which
generally should be hard to do. Macfarlane's study suggests that there is a
276 See supra Part IH.D.
277 See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 34:13
(2008).
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greater risk of lack of effective informed consent by clientS278 than
unwarranted malpractice risk of CL lawyers.
Although it would be desirable for lawyers to screen cases for
appropriateness of various dispute resolution processes and obtain clients'
informed consent in the selection of a process in virtually all their cases, the
ethical rules do not clearly require this.279 In some jurisdictions, there are
rules regarding lawyers' advice to clients about dispute resolution options. 280
Even where there are such rules, the provisions are often less demanding
requirements than the rules applicable to CL.281 For example, some rules
only "encourage" lawyers to discuss dispute resolution options and even
when lawyers may be required to advise clients about such options, this
requirement may not be triggered until there is an actual negotiation or
settlement opportunity.282 Moreover, such rules do not contemplate screening
cases for appropriateness. 283 Although it would be beyond the jurisdiction of
ethics committees to require lawyers in non-CL cases to follow the same
requirements as in CL cases, we encourage bar associations and other dispute
resolution organizations to urge lawyers to follow the spirit of these rules as
appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Collaborative Law is an impressive dispute resolution practice that
provides real benefits to parties in conflict. CL experts and ethical authorities
recognize that the great power of a CL process also creates significant risks
in certain situations. Thus, lawyers counseling clients who are considering
CL have the duty to assess whether CL would be appropriate and to obtain
clients' informed consent to use it. Practitioners, professional leaders, and
policymakers can help develop healthy CL practice by carefully analyzing
risks in CL and implementing measures to reduce them. This Article
provides concrete suggestions for all these stakeholders to help promote
well-informed parties' use of CL in appropriate cases.
278 See supra Part IV.
279 Professor Marshall Breger's thorough analysis of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct suggests that such a duty may be implied from Rules 1.2, 1.4, 2.1,
and 3.2, though this is not clear. See Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required
to Advise a Client of ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 427, 428-31, 433-36
(2000).
2 80 See COLE ET AL., supra note 267, at § 4:3.
281 See id.
282 See id.
283 See id.
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Appendix A. Factors Affecting Appropriateness of Mediation,
Collaborative Law, and Cooperative Law Procedures284
Factors Unassisted Mediation is Collaborative Cooperative Traditional
Negotiation is appropriate Law is Law is Litigation is
appropriate if: if: appropriate if: appropriate if: appropriate
if:
Parties' capabilities
Ability of parties are able (a) parties are one or more one or more one or more
parties to to assert their able to assert parties need or parties need or parties need or
assert their interests well their interests want a lawyer to want a lawyer want a lawyer
interests well and/or advocate their to advocate to advocate
(b) lawyers interests their interests their interests
can participate
in mediation
Parties' attitudes about professional services
Parties' parties cannot parties can parties are parties are parties are
resources afford and/or afford and/or willing and able willing and willing and
and desire desire a to pay for able to pay for able to pay for
willingness professional limited level substantial substantial substantial
to pay for service, of professional professional professional
substantial possibly professional services and services services
professiona because they service, willing to pay
I services want to possibly cost of hiring
maximize their because they new litigation
own decision- want to lawyers if there
making maximize is no agreement
their own in collaborative
decision- law
making
Parties Parties do not Parties want (a) parties do not (a) parties do (a) parties do
desire for want neutral neutral third want neutral not want not want
neutral third party to party to third party to neutral third neutral third
third party manage the manage the manage the party to party to
to manage process process process or (b) manage the manage the
the process are willing to process or (b) process or (b)
hire mediator in are willing to are willing to
addition to hire mediator hire mediator
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Unassisted Mediation is Collaborative Cooperative Traditional
Negotiation is appropriate Law is Law is Litigation is
appropriate if: if: appropriate if: appropriate if: appropriate
if:
lawyers in addition to in addition to
lawyers lawyers
parties are parties are both parties are both parties are at least one
reluctant or reluctant or willing to hire willing to hire party is willing
unwilling to unwilling to lawyers lawyers to hire a
hire lawyers at hire lawyers lawyer
all or to take at all or to
the lead in take the lead
negotiation in negotiation
not applicable parties want parties are parties want to parties want to
to be able to willing to risk be able to keep be able to keep
keep their losing their their lawyers in their lawyers
lawyers in collaborative contested in contested
contested lawyers if the litigation litigation
litigation parties litigate
parties are not parties want a parties are parties are parties want a
concerned procedure that willing to use an willing to use procedure that
about using a has been innovative an innovative is the subject
well- studied procedure that procedure that of well-
established extensively has not been has not been developed
dispute and that is the studied studied norms and
resolution subject of extensively and extensively and practices
procedure and well- that is not the that is not the
practice developed subject of well- subject of well-
norms and developed norms developed
practices and practices norms and
practices
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Factors Unassisted Mediation is Collaborative Cooperative Traditional
Negotiation is appropriate Law is Law is Litigation is
appropriate if: if: appropriate if: appropriate if: appropriate
if:
Parties' risk assessments and preferences
Risk that a (a) there is a (a) there is a (a) there is a low there may be a there may be a
party low risk of low risk of risk of parties significant risk significant risk
would take parties will try parties will try will try to take that one party that one party
advantage to take to take advantage of would take would take
of another advantage of advantage of each other or (b) advantage of advantage of
each other, each other, there is a another another
and/or (b) and/or (b) significant risk
parties are parties are of parties trying
capable of capable of to take
representing representing advantage and
themselves themselves they are willing
effectively, effectively, to risk that the
and/or (c) and/or (c) other party
parties may parties use would terminate
hire mediator collaborative law
professionals if skilled in as an adversarial
needed managing tactic
conflict,
and/or (d)
lawyers
participate in
mediation
Risk that a parties are parties are there is a low there may be a there may be a
party may unwilling to willing to risk that a party significant risk significant risk
want to use make an make a will want to use that a party will that a party
litigation investment to limited contested want to use will want to
reduce risk of investment to litigation contested use contested
contested reduce risk of litigation litigation
litigation contested
litigation
Need for a party does a party may a party does not a party may a party may
threat of not need threat need threat of need threat of need threat of need threat of
litigation to of litigation to litigation to litigation to litigation to litigation to
motivate a motivate motivate motivate another motivate motivate
party to act another party another party party to act another party another party
reasonably to act to act reasonably to act to act
reasonably reasonably reasonably reasonably
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s Unassisted Mediation is Collaborative Cooperative Traditional
Negotiation is appropriate Law is Law is Litigation is
appropriate if: if: appropriate if: appropriate if: appropriate
if:
parties prefer parties prefer parties strongly parties prefer. parties prefer
o to avoid to avoid prefer to avoid to avoid to avoid
litigation but litigation but litigation and are litigation but litigation but
Id are willing to are willing to willing to use it are willing to are willing to
,n use it if needed use it if only as a last use it if needed use it if needed
to protect their needed to resort to protect their to protect their
interests protect their interests interests
interests
e parties are parties are parties are wary parties are parties are
ice wary of wary of of litigation wary of wary of
settlement and settlement pressure and settlement settlement
ent litigation pressure and willing to risk pressure and pressure and
C pressure but willing to risk greater willing to risk willing to risk
willing to risk greater settlement greater greater
)n1 litigation litigation pressure litigation litigation
pressure pressure pressure pressure
*This table assumes that any lawyers for mediation participants do not attend
mediation sessions except as noted.
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Appendix B. Client Information About Collaborative Representation285
ELEMENTS OF BENEFITS RISKS
COLLABORATIVE
REPRESENTATION
COLLABORATIVE
GUIDELINES AND
PRINCIPLES
The Collaborative
process involves treating
each other respectfully
and satisfying the
interests of all family
members rather than
trying to gain individual
advantage.
* The Collaborative process sets a
positive tone so that you and your
spouse can work to satisfy your
interests.
* The process can reduce
unnecessary and destructive
conflict and avoid litigation.
* This process may not
produce a constructive
agreement if your spouse
will respond only to threats,
litigation, or a decision by a
judge.
* The Collaborative
process may not be
appropriate if you or your
spouse do not have the
ability to participate
effectively.
* Domestic violence,
substance abuse, or mental
illness may make the
process inappropriate.
* You may feel
unprotected if you want
your Attorney to advocate
strongly to protect your
interests (including your
concerns about your
children).
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285 This Table was published in Mosten, supra note 159, at 190-93.
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ELEMENTS OF BENEFITS RISKS
COLLABORATIVE
REPRESENTATION
PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT
REQUIRING
DISQUALIFICATION
OF ATTORNEYS IN
LITIGATION
Clients and Attorneys
sign a Participation
Agreement that includes
a Court Disqualification
Clause, which states that
if the parties do not
resolve the matter in the
Collaborative process,
neither attorney will
represent the parties in
any contested litigation
between you. If you
would want to hire an
attorney to represent you
in court, you would need
to hire another attorney.
* The process can increase the
motivation of all parties and
Attorneys to reach a settlement. If
negotiations break down and a
law suit is filed, both parties need
to hire new Attorneys and the
Collaborative Attorneys are out of
a job. As a result, everyone in the
Collaborative process focuses
exclusively on reaching
agreement.
* All parties and Attorneys focus
on negotiation from the very
beginning of the process.
* Collaborative Attorneys work to
negotiate constructively and avoid
attacking the other side.
* If the Collaborative
representation ends, you
and your spouse will need
to spend additional time
and money to hire new
Attorneys and may lose
some information or
momentum during a
transition of Attorneys.
After developing a
relationship of trust and
confidence with your
Collaborative Attorney, you
might feel abandoned
emotionally and/or
strategically at a time of
contentious conflict.
* You may feel a lot of
pressure if your spouse is
willing to terminate the
process and you want to
stay in it.
* You should be cautious
about using a Collaborative
process if you do not trust
that your spouse will
negotiate honestly and
sincerely.
TRAINED * You and your spouse may 9 You or your spouse may
COLLABORATIVE benefit from using a team of feel some pressure to use
PROFESSIONALS Collaborative professionals with more professionals that you
different skills, want or feel that you can
The Collaborative afford.
process may involve a a Collaborative professionals
team of Collaborative usually have had special training
professionals who have to help promote constructive
specialized training in settlements.
collaborative divorce
skills. Separate divorce oll By investing the time and
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ELEMENTS OF BENEFITS RISKS
COLLABORATIVE
REPRESENTATION
coaches help each party money for professional training,
to deal with emotional, Collaborative professionals
relationship, and demonstrate a commitment to
parenting issues. Child constructive negotiation.
development specialists
and financial
professionals may be
hired jointly to provide
unbiased information
and advice.
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ELEMENTS OF BENEFITS RISKS
COLLABORATIVE
REPRESENTATION
DIRECT You and your spouse control e You and your spouse
COMMUNICATION the decisions that affect your lives might increase conflict
AND and families, without making any
DECISIONMAKING progress if your
BY THE PARTIES 9 You and your spouse can communication styles are
discuss both non-legal and legal disrespectful or harmful to
Parties are the key issues. each other and you cannot
decision makers and you work together
communicate directly 9 You and your spouse can constructively.
with each other and the develop communication skills and
Attorneys. learn how to communicate more
effectively in the future.
VOLUNTARY * You and your spouse agree to Your spouse may hide
DISCLOSURE OF provide each other with full assets and other critical
ASSETS, information of marital and information unless you use
OBLIGATIONS, AND separate assets so that you can a formal discovery process.
IMPORTANT make informed decisions.
INFORMATION
e The Collaborative process can
You and your spouse include a protection against
make a binding parties' failure to disclose fully. If
commitment that you either party does not make the
will fully disclose assets required disclosures, the
and will not to hide agreement can be set aside.
important relevant
information. * The Collaborative process does
not use formal court "discovery"
processes to investigate the facts
of your case. This can save money
and avoid conflicts. Discovery
does not necessarily produce full
information.
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ELEMENTS OF BENEFITS RISKS
COLLABORATIVE
REPRESENTATION
CONFIDENTIALITY Confidentiality can encourage
OF COLLABORATIVE you and your spouse to talk
PROCESS openly and reach creative
solutions.
Communications in the
Collaborative process Confidentiality permits your
are generally family business to remain private
confidential and by avoiding public testimony in
inadmissible in court. court and keeping sensitive
documents out of the public
records.
DIVORCE PROCESS * The Collaborative process can Collaborative cases can
MAY SAVE TIME help you reduce take a long time if there are
AND MONEY The length of negotiations no court deadlines to keep
and the cost of your divorce, the process moving.
The Collaborative
process may save you You may save money by The use of a team of
and your spouse time avoiding litigation procedures. professionals can increase
and money in handling Specialized Collaborative the cost of your divorce.
your divorce. Some professionals can help resolve
courts give disputes that might otherwise go
Collaborative cases to court.
priority within their
court system and cases Settlements can be processed
may not have to follow quickly in court so that you can
strict court schedules. move on with your life.
I have read this chart and I understand Collaborative representation and
its benefits and risks.
I have had an opportunity to discuss any concerns and questions I may
have with my attorney before signing an Attorney-Client Engagement
Agreement and before signing a Collaborative Participation Agreement with
my spouse.
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I also understand that if I have additional questions or concerns about the
Collaborative representation after it begins, I am encouraged to discuss them
with my attorney.
Date
CLIENT
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